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Eighth Annual Lloyd K. Garrison Lecture
on Environmental Law
Environmental Law in the Political
Ecosystem - Coping With The
Reality of Politics
ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER*
Humans are animals that are political.
Aristotlet
I. Introduction: A Caveat and a Political Proposition
Caveat: Much of the following disquisition is based upon a legal
war story, with all the dangers that implies. The kind people who
invited me to present this year's Garrison Lecture were warned
that I would be deeply enmeshed this sabbatical year in the pro-
ject of finally writing, after twenty-plus years, a book about an
endangered species case in which my students and I, for six years
in the 1970s, had the privilege and frustrating burden of repre-
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; J.D. Yale Law School; S.J.D.
University of Michigan Law School; A.B. Princeton University. I am grateful to my
colleagues at Pace University Law School for their invitation to deliver this Garrison
Lecture essay, and delighted to have been able to sneak into the lineup of such an
eminent assemblage of predecessors. Thanks to David Cole, Justin Surber and Jer-
emy McDiarmid for assistance on resources and citations. All errors are mine.
t Aristotle, The POLITIKA, or POLITICS, Book 1 Part 2 (BC 350), paraphrased,
without legitimate expertise, in order to achieve freshened context and gender
neutrality. But compare the alternative paraphrase of this Aristotelian epigram infra
at p.4 8 7 .
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senting a two-and-a-half inch fish. The case is Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill et al.1 which pitted the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity's final dam, the Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee River,
against a diminutive endangered fish, the snail darter.
But the snail darter case apparently has assumed something
of the character of a classic. In a recent national on-line poll of
environmental law professors seeking a consensus on America's
ten most significant environmental protection court decisions,
TVA v. Hill was ranked number one, receiving almost twice as
many votes as the runners-up. 2 More than any case I know of, it
serves as a figurative microtome3-an analytical slice of life
presenting hundreds of individuals and dozens of legal and
governmental institutions in interesting and revealing ways. It
taught me and my students a great deal during the years we car-
ried it on, and continues to teach us as we look back at it. Fortu-
nately-although ultimately we lost the fight, the ill-considered
dam was built and the darter's river valley habitat that was a na-
tional treasure is forever lost-the fish still lives on today in sev-
eral transplanted populations as a merely "threatened" species.
Less fortunately, and in part ironically because the fish survived,
the name of the fish is still invoked as an example of grossly mis-
guided, extremist, unnecessary, and illegitimate environmental
regulation.
The snail darter controversy serves as a useful political case
study because it reverberates with stark political overtones as
well as legal meaning. The case-often depicted, even by environ-
1. 437 U.S. 153 (1978), affg 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977) rev'g 419 F. Supp. 753
(E.D. Tenn. 1976), (hereinafter TVA v. Hill). As noted here in the text and later, I was
privileged to be petitioner and attorney in the snail darter case over six years in the
courts up through the Supreme Court, in the agencies, and in its legislative process.
An illustrated slideshow and background account of the endangered fish-dam litiga-
tion is available online at http://www.law.mercer.edu/elaw/zygplater.html, and is
drawn upon in parts of this essay. (Copy on file with Pace Environmental Law
Review.)
2. See Posting of James Salzman, salzman@wcl.american.edu, to envlawprofs@
darkwing.uoregon.edu (Oct. 26, 2001) (copy on file with Pace Environmental Law Re-
view). The second-ranked nominations were Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) and Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C.
Cir. 1976). It should be emphasized that the polling ranked the judicial decisions, not
necessarily the efforts of the attorneys who argued them.
3. A microtome is a scientific instrument that shaves thin slices of material from
sampled objects in order to make laboratory slides that can be viewed through a mi-
croscope, revealing the objects' fundamental components, structures, and internal
processes.
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mentalists,4 as The Most Extreme Environmental Case There
Ever Was-has been nationally notorious almost from the start of
the litigation in 1974. Twenty years later the snail darter
resurfaces regularly in news commentary and editorials, congres-
sional floor speeches, 5 and Rush Limbaugh's diatribes against en-
vironmentalism.6 Moreover, because the merits of the fish/dam
4. See, e.g., John Marks, Special Report: The Return of the Kennedys: Struggling
Against Conservatives and Cynics, A New Generation of Activists Tries to Assert Itself,
U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Sept. 2, 1996, at 42.
5. 143 Cong. Rec. S9411, (daily ed. Sep. 16, 1997) (statement of Sen. Chafee)
("Controversy has surrounded the law, however, since its passage. In the mid 1970's,
the law became ensnarled in a bitter fight over the construction of the $900 million
[sic] Tellico Dam and the dam's impacts on the hapless snail darter."); 142 CONG. REC.
HI0501-01 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1996) (Tribute to the Honorable James H. Quillen on
his retirement from Congress) ("And Jim [was] persuaded that the fish could get
along just as well whether the dam was there or not"); 141 CONG. REC. S6423-02
(daily ed. May 10, 1995) (statement of Sen. Packwood) ("We do not care if the snail
darter disappears"); 137 CONG. REc. S7848-01 (daily ed. June 13, 1991) (statement of
Sen. Johnston) ("Ask hardworking voters to sacrifice in the name of the snail darter,
and, if they are feeling polite, they will give you a shrug"); 136 CONG. REC. H7508-06
(daily ed. Sept. 13, 1990) (statement of Rep. Delay) ("Because the rabid environmen-
talists felt it was more important to jeopardize the lives of our brave American ser-
viceman than risk the death of a single snail darter.").
6. "America today is a new homosocialism, communism. What these people are
is against private property rights. They are trying to attack capitalism and corporate
America in the form of going after timber companies. And they're trying to say that
we must preserve these virgin trees because the spotted owl and the rat kangaroo and
whatever live in them, and it's the only place they can live, the snail darter and
whatever it is." Rush Limbaugh, The Rush Limbaugh Show (Infinity radio broadcast,
Dec. 7, 1993).
The snail darter case has likewise been used as an example of nonsensical litiga-
tion in a much more Olympian setting by one of our most prominent savants of juris-
prudence. In LAw's EMPIRE, my old professor Ronald Dworkin gets virtually all the
facts of the case wrong, then bitterly criticizes Chief Justice Burger's decision for en-
forcing the statute on its terms and refusing to allow the district judge or the Justices
to do what Professor Dworkin thinks preferable: to forge judicial adjustments to stat-
utes to effectuate what the judge or Justices believe to make better sense. Here too
the snail darter may serve as a canary, warning us of the dicey legal process hazards
lying within the coal mine of Professor Dworkin's propositions. See Ronald D. Dwor-
kin, LAW'S EMPIRE 20-23, 314-354 (1988).
In March of 2002, the keywords "snail darter" brought up 256 hits in a Lexis-
Nexis search of press articles from around the nation over the past two years-most
often pejorative references to the fish and its environmentalist friends. See, e.g., Pat-
rick Buchanan, On the Record with Greta Van Susteren, (Fox television broadcast,
Feb. 8, 2002), Transcript # 020805cb.260 ("If the snail darter is a species that's dying
out, people are concerned... [w]hy would they not be concerned that European peo-
ples who have created the greatest civilization in history, are dying out and will be a
tiny fraction of two percent or three percent of the world's population by the end of
this century?"); John Guffey, Editorial, SUNDAY OKLAHOMAN, Jan. 27, 2002 ("Of
course, birds, snail darters and other assorted wildlife are worth more than human
beings in our distorted minds."); Hold Your Breath, Suckers, ECONOMIST, Feb. 9, 2002
("Farmers, industrialists and conservatives fume that the ESA has become a way for
3
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juxtaposition continue to be understood 180 degrees backward
even by most environmentalists, it seems worthy of a retrospec-
tive look.
Proposition: In this essay, the proposition I want to draw from the
narrative of the endangered species litigation is derivatively Aris-
totelian-that we must consciously, actively, and explicitly inte-
grate an informed consideration of human politics into what we
teach and do in environmental law. The proposition is not that we
should steep ourselves in party politics, although there are inter-
esting observations aplenty that could be made on the direct
consequences that the two major parties (and occasionally their
wistful smaller incarnations) have on the evolution of envi-
ronmental law. Nor do I want to address Bush Jr.-Cheney or
Clinton-Gore politics, nor Reagan-Bush Sr. or Carter-Mondale
politics, although there are interesting views and consequences
there, too. Nor politics within the judicial process, because that is
a phenomenon that we professors already know how to discuss
with our students.
Rather I'd like to explore some political realities in the admin-
istrative and legislative process that my students and I learned
for the first time from our intense experience of our particular
case, realities that may well be familiar to most of this audience
but nevertheless deserve explicit acknowledgment and thought
about how we teach and use them.
The proposition offered here operates at two different levels:
practical politics-it is essential to us as legal educators that
we explicitly acknowledge and help our students understand
the structures, contexts, and maneuverings of politics in the
daily practice of environmental law-because many law stu-
dents have only a naive eighth grade civics book comprehen-
sion, or less, of how the governmental and human systems
they are entering really work,
and further, by extension,
political overview-that inevitably we should define for our-
selves, and help our students define for themselves, some
overall schematic political constructs, some ways to picture
the structures of societal governance, so that we and they
can have a working personal and professional sense of where
environmentalists to enlist such previously obscure creatures as the spotted owl and
the snail darter in anti-business campaigns.").
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environmental law and lawyers fit within the overall
scheme.
This proposition, especially in its latter portion, risks the crit-
icism that it is just a mite grandiose. But it reflects the fact that
most of us in this field believe environmental law is different from
other fields of law. It is a jurisprudence that pegs its operational
daily standards and processes not only on the present moment-
on this fiscal year, or this Administration, or this decade, or on the
lifetime of any individual-but on the long term quality and sus-
tainability of human life within the richly interconnected complex-
ity of all the other systems that make up our Spaceship Earth. 7
And in terms of human governance, most of us in this field have
repeatedly discovered that, if you scratch away at the surface of
almost any issue or controversy in environmental law, pretty soon
you will be looking at some of the very most fundamental ques-
tions of democratic government.
Environmental law has long played the role of the little kid
pointing to the Emperor's bare tush that no one dare mention. We
force power players to acknowledge the reality that acid rain and
global warming truly exist, that the Mineral Leasing Act of 1872
continues to be a scandalous giveaway, that nonpoint sources of
water pollution and secondary National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) are important but evaded, that chlorinated
hydrocarbons do not simply disappear but instead travel far in the
atmosphere and in our own bodies' hormone systems, 8 and so on.
But it is useful to identify our own speak-not. In our own reluc-
tance to acknowledge the ubiquitousness of politics we too are em-
perors. In the present generation of environmental law, whatever
it is,9 we are excruciatingly hesitant to acknowledge that an ex-
plicit exegesis of political factors and forces is a necessary part of
virtually all environmental law analyses, part of how we frame
7. "We travel together, passengers on a little spaceship, dependent on its vulner-
able resources of air and soil, all committed for our safety to its security and peace,
preserved from annihilation only by the care, the work, and, I will say, the love we
give our fragile craft." Adlai Stevenson, Address at the United Nations, 1965.
8. THEO COLBORN ET AL., OUR STOLEN FUTURE: ARE WE THREATENING OuR FER-
TILITY, INTELLIGENCE, AND SURvIvAL?-A SCIENTIFIC DETECTIVE STORY (Plume 1997).
9. Is this the third generation of environmental law, or the fourth, or fifth? (Does
a wistful period of alleged collaborative trusting partnerships between government
and industry-perhaps ended by Enron, Global Crossing, Tyco, and WorldCom-
count as a generation of environmental law?)
5
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our own environmental law work,10 although most of us do not
teach our students how to scope or cope with politics.
II. Practical Politics: A Little Fish Goes to Washington
TVA v. Hill was in effect the final act in a long running his-
tory of conflict between an adamant federal public works agency
that wanted to build one more dam and a remarkably persistent
evolving coalition of citizens who fought bitterly to save the river
and its valley."
Ironically, framing the story is the fact that it is now clear the
citizens were overwhelmingly correct about the merits of the con-
flict from the very beginning, while the agency was terribly wrong.
This is not just the sour-grapes assertion of an erstwhile advocate.
On the objective record at the end, the TVA's Tellico Dam project
was a stark public policy mistake, measured in straight economic
10. In a recent series of discussions with colleagues in Oregon I focused on the
fact that virtually all public interest litigation must operate simultaneously on two
tracks-on the strictly legal process involved in courts and agencies, and on the con-
current track of public opinion and legislative politics that lies beyond the courts. It is
the latter track, where the Press is so important, that ultimately determines final
outcomes on the ground (or in the air, water, and living systems) in so many of our
environmental law cases. See generally Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Law and the Fourth Es-
tate: Endangered Nature, the Press, and the Dicey Game of Democratic Governance, 32
ENVTL. L. 1 (2002). This essay adds to that a recognition of practical politics within
the legal process itself, particularly in dealing with federal agencies and the machin-
ery of congressional politics. And behind that lies grander political terrain ....
11. A thumbnail chronology:
1959 Red Wagner, Chair of TVA, tells his agency to develop an economic
development rationale to build a 69th TVA dam, on the last 33 miles
of the Little Tennessee River; planners' brainstorming leads to Tim-
berlake Model City plan to be built on shores of a new reservoir.
1968 Tellico Project funding begins, with a $65 million budget; Dam itself
is built: a $4 million concrete structure astride the south channel of
the Little Tennessee River; land acquisition.
1971-72 TVA declines to do an EIS; but a NEPA injunction forces halt.
1973 NEPA injunction dissolved, but snail darter is discovered.
1974 Hank Hill needs a term paper topic; dam opponents line up behind
the darter; TVA re-starts construction and accelerates land clear-
ance.
1975 Listing the darter as an official endangered species & listing of criti-
cal habitat.
1976 Trial; citizen attempts to get Interior to enforce Act.
1977 Sixth Circuit rules for darter; issues injunction.
1978 Supreme Court hears case and affirms injunction, 6-3.
1979 January, God Squad unanimously upholds injunction on economic
grounds; but September, an appropriations rider overrides the
injunction; Jimmy Carter woefully signs the bill.
1980 River is gone; darter's natural population is terminated, although
transplants survive.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol19/iss2/1
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terms as well as the less tangible rubrics of social, ecological and
aesthetic concerns. 12 It destroyed major public economic values
that greatly exceeded the project's actual economic benefits, and
the benefits produced were far less than would have been pro-
duced by non-dam development alternatives repeatedly proposed
by the citizen environmentalists, alternatives consistent with con-
serving the little fish.1 3
Scope out protagonist agencies: they are human too. Twenty-five
years after its founding, TVA, the New Deal's brightest rose, had
lost momentum and suffered low morale. Founded in the late
1930s, TVA's original missions were to make fertilizer and electri-
cal power. Understandably, TVA chose to focus on power, and in
12. The easiest way to establish the actual merits of the Tellico Project is to re-
view the unanimous decision of the unique Cabinet-level review forum created espe-
cially to analyze the competing merits of the Tellico Dam after our Supreme Court
victory. At that point, in December 1978 when the project was ninety-five percent
complete, an intensive staff economic analysis, basically ignoring all the environmen-
tal, historical, and cultural values that weighed against the dam, led the Cabinet
members and other appointees on the first Endangered Species Committee or "God
Squad" as it was called, to decide unanimously that TVA's project had never made
sense. As Charles Schultze, the Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Ad-
visors and a member of the Committee declared, "The interesting phenomenon is that
here is a project that is 95% complete, and if one takes just the cost of finishing it
against the [total] benefits, and does it properly, it doesn't pay! Which says something
about the original design!" Endangered Species Committee, Tellico Dam and Reservoir
Project 25-26 (Jan. 23, 1979) (unpublished transcript of public hearing) (emphasis
added) (copy on file with Pace Environmental Law Review). See also text at footnote
56 infra.
13. The citizens' proposed alternative development plan for the valley included
tourist routes to the National Park, return of agricultural land to dispossessed farm-
ers, industrial sites in two industrial parks (of greater capacity than TVA's plan be-
cause low-lying lands would not be flooded), and residential and commercial
development. With a major north-south interstate, 1-75, and a major east-west inter-
state, 1-40, within six miles of the valley, a significant number of the National Park's
annual ten million visitors could access the Park through the valley's historic sites. If
this entry region was designed and developed to coordinate with the Park, as it could
because TVA already owned enough land, the valley could continue to be a prime agri-
cultural community, interspersed with tourist facilities for camping, horseback rid-
ing, float trips and exploring historical features like the forts, Indian towns, and
Paleolithic archaeological sites (as even Ohio has done with its archaeological sites,
with so much less to build on). The alternative development options were prepared by
the citizens in cooperation with the University of Tennessee School of Architecture,
but never were mentioned by TVA nor covered by the local press.
Since the completion of the dam and the flooding of the reservoir, the Tellico Pro-
ject has become primarily a second-home development project for wealthy retirees, on
land transferred on advantageous terms to a development corporation owned in part
by Walmart's Sam Walton. The industrial park has attracted a number of industries,
but none for which this reservoir was necessary. The farmers were unable to repur-
chase their condemned lands and now can go onto their old properties only in the
capacity of servants or employees.
7
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its first years rapidly became a world-famous dam-building
agency. But by 1948 TVA had built three dozen dams, using up
virtually all the major river sites that would generate substantial
power for the system.14 But it is hard for agencies as well as indi-
viduals to give up noble self-images. In bureaucracies, moreover,
it turns out that once you get going, "a rolling stone gathers mo-
mentum." So the agency kept on building dams, smaller and
smaller, most of them based on shaky benefit-cost justifications.
By 1962 the agency had more than 65 dams, with 2500 linear
miles of river turned into a chain of sluggish impoundments de-
scending to the Mississippi. Tennessee now contains more shore-
line than all the Great Lakes combined.15
TVA wanted to keep alive the self-image and public sense of
its bright progressive mission instead of settling into an identity
as just another corpulent utility company. And what better cameo
than the classic mental image of a dam?-bold men placing big
chunks of concrete to block and conquer the forces of nature, back-
ing up a river into swollen captivity under human control, and re-
leasing it according to engineering whim in frothy spillways, their
spray throwing rainbows to the sky.
After building more than five dozen dams, however, TVA had
run out of places where another traditional dam could be justified.
The agency had shifted ninety percent of its energy production to
coal and nukes and was indeed becoming just another utility. But
in a decisive turnaround meeting held at his Watts Bar Dam con-
ference center in 1959, Aubrey "Red" Wagner, the agency's gen-
eral manager and later chairman, resurrected the agency's spirits
by launching a new initiative that might let them build more
dams. Starting with a dam to impound the last thirty-three miles
of flowing river left in the Little Tennessee River, the Tellico Dam,
TVA would define a new mission and justify its continued exis-
tence by commencing a new series of "regional economic demon-
14. The agency began to shift its mode of power production so that by the 1970s,
ninety percent of TVA's power was being generated by nuclear and coal-burning
steam plants.
15. The Great Lakes contain 7870 miles of shoreline. 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITAN-
NICA. The Great Lakes 774 (1973 ed.), cited in Zygmunt J. B. Plater, Reflected in a
River: Agency Accountability and the TVA Tellico Dam Case, 49 TENN. L. REV. 747
(1973). The total shoreline of TVA reservoirs within Tennessee is roughly 10,000 in
summertime. Telephone interview with TVA Public Information Office (Sept. 3,
1982).
[Vol. 19
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stration" projects. 16 The Tellico Project became an obsession for
Chairman Wagner, and by extension for the entire agency he dom-
inated. Wagner engineered an intensive internal mobilization of
TVA's forces, driving the Tellico Dam to completion despite its lack
of normal water project purposes and despite its violations of envi-
ronmental law.
To understand the merits of the $160 million Tellico Dam pro-
ject you have to start with the bemusing fact that most of that
sum was for land purchase and development. The project's pri-
mary avowed purpose besides recreation was to create a base for a
model industrial city to be called "Timberlake New Town" that the
agency said would require a reservoir. At a cost of $850 million-
most of it not included in the Tellico Dam accounting, including at
least $145 million in additional "infrastructure grant" subsidies
that Congress would be asked to provide at some later date-TVA
and its partner, the Boeing Corporation, said their hypothetical
Timberlake City would bring 50,000 people and 26,000 new jobs to
the area. 17 The "shoreland development" benefits of this plan,
along with even greater hypothesized recreational benefits, al-
16. The internal agency story is told in a book written from TVA archives, WiL-
LIAM BRUCE WHEELER & MICHAEL J. McDONALD, TVA AND THE TELLICO DAM, 1936-
1979: A BUREAUCRATIC CRISIS IN POST-INDUSTRIAL AMERICA (1986), and a case study,
STEPHEN J. RECHICHAR & MICHAEL R. FITZGERALD, THE CONSEQUENCES OF ADMINIS-
TRATIVE DECISION: TVA's ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MISSION AND INTRAGOVERNMENT
REGULATION (1983). These two books are excellent sources of background data on the
history and merits of the controversy and TVA's adamancy in pushing the dam in the
face of the law and critical analysis on the merits.
The TVA can self-authorize projects if they fit its charter, and Wagner was seizing
upon Section 22 of the TVA Act which authorizes "the proper use, conservation, and
development of the natural resources of the Tennessee River drainage basin and of
such adjoining territory as may be related to or materially affected by the develop-
ment consequent to this chapter.. .. " TVA Act § 22, 16 U.S.C. § 831u (1994) (original
version at ch. 32, § 22, 48 Stat. 69 (1933)).
17. TVA planners hypothesized the Timberlake model city following the design of
a utopian city conceived by Athelstan Spilhaus in the 1940s that likewise was never
built. See TVA, Tennessee Valley Authority Environmental Statement: Timberlake
New Community 1-1-32 (Jan. 9, 1976). TVA asserted, with no empirical data, that its
model city would need a reservoir, hypothesizing that it would best develop if it had a
barge channel in addition to the already-existing existing railroad and interstate
highway facilities. Swatara, Minnesota, also considered building a Spilhaus utopia in
the form of a 20,000-acre domed city, which, after approximately $1.5 million in pri-
vate and public money spent on planning throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, was
finally defeated in the 1973 Minnesota legislature due to stiff opposition and budget-
ary constraints. Once a Dead and Buried Idea, a Futuristic Domed City Shows Signs
of Life, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 27, 1987, at 3C. TVA planners named the hypothetical city
"Timberlake" after Lt. Henry Timberlake of George III's colonial army who visited the
valley and produced the first map of the area in 1762.
9
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lowed TVA to claim a 1.70/1.00 benefit-cost ratio (later modified
downward). 8 Because Tellico was such a marginal site, the dam
would have no generators, and traditional water project benefits
were minimal-small potential increments in barge navigation,
water supply, power enhancement, 19 and flood control. TVA con-
demned more than twice as much land to give to Boeing and sell to
developers than to impound with a reservoir-more than 38,000
acres taken from more than 340 farm families, with only 12,000
acres to be flooded.20 Only about twenty-nine percent of the
project lands would be covered by the reservoir. Despite the inevi-
table image of the controversy, the Tellico project was fundamen-
tally not a hydroelectric dam project. The dam was just the
dubious central feature of a federal recreation and land-develop-
ment project.21
18. Under Senate Document No. 97, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), every federal
agency, when spending tax payer dollars, had to have a theoretically profitable bene-
fit-cost ratio-for every taxpayer dollar spent, the proposed project has to be able to
claim to earn at least $1.01 over 100 years. Beyond hyperbolic benefit projections,
agency planners were helped in projecting their positive ratios by the fact that they
could treat the cost of taxpayer dollars as interest-free, or nearly so.
The official Benefit-Cost ration as of the 1972 environmental impact statement:
DIRECT ANNUAL BENEFITS:
Flood control $505,000
Navigation 400,000
Power 400,000
Recreation 1,440,000
Fish & wildlife 220,000
Water supply 70,000
Shoreline development 714,000
Redevelopment 15,000
Total Direct Annual Benefits: $3,760,000
DIRECT ANNUAL COSTS:
Interest and amortization $2,045,000
Operation & maintenance 205,000
Total Annual Costs: $2,250,000
Benefit-Cost Ratio (later downgraded): 1.7: 1.
From TVA, TELLICO DAM PROJECT EIS 1-1-49 (1972).
19. Tellico had no generators but could redirect flows through a canal to an adja-
cent dam, generating circa twenty-four megawatts of power. To put this in perspec-
tive, TVA's existing system contained more than 22,000 megawatts capacity, and an
economist figured that the valley lands, if their annual biomass production was
merely burned in a steam plant, would produce more power than a dam, netting
thirty-five megawatts.
20. Under the agency's special juryless condemnation procedures the farmlands
could be taken for an average of less than $400 an acre. ZygInunt J. B. Plater, Re-
flected in a River: Agency Accountability and the TVA Tellico Dam Case, 49 TENN L.
REV. 747, 759 n.37 (1973).
21. It was never seriously questioned within TVA why an economic development
project required a dam. Institutionally it was well understood that the opportunity to
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol19/iss2/1
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The resources that the dam project would eliminate, on the
other hand, were extraordinary. The broad valley of the Little
Tennessee River where it flows out of the Great Smoky Mountains
had been an especially rich natural place for millennia. Archaeo-
logical digs along the river revealed the oldest continuous human
habitation sites in all of North America, more than 10,000 years of
human history. The River's waters ran cool, highly oxygenated,
fertile, and filled with fish. The valley lands were rich beyond be-
lief, high-grade topsoil to a depth of twenty feet or more. The
Cherokees' central towns, their most sacred places, and Chota,
their holy city of refuge, were located here on the riverbank. The
first Anglo colonists entered the valley in the 18th century, build-
ing a log fort, Fort Loudon, as their southwestern-most redoubt
protecting them and their Cherokee allies against the French and
other Indian tribes. After Andrew Jackson drove the Cherokees
out of the valley, white settlers moved in to take over the vacated
Cherokee lands. Many of those early families and old Fort Loudon
were still there in the valley 200 years later when TVA decided to
build Tellico Dam.22 The agricultural land along the river was
home to more than 350 family farms, with 15,500 acres of the rich-
build another dam was the central motivation for the project and an essential part of
the reinvigoration of internal agency morale. WHEELER & McDONALD, supra note 16,
at 3-33. TVA's most constantly voiced justification for insisting on a dam and reser-
voir was the so-called "Foster Hypothesis." In conversations with lower-level TVA
staffers in the 1970s the author was repeatedly told of the internal importance of the
"Foster Hypothesis," which underpinned the rosy economic projections for Timberlake
by asserting that industry would be drawn to a site so closely accessible to three dif-
ferent modes of transportation-in this case, two interstate highways, a railroad line,
and a barge channel. They indicated that this functional hypothesis was not based on
empirical data but on Foster's executive intuition. Minnard "Mike" Foster, TVA's di-
rector of navigation and regional development planning, regularly repeated his intui-
tive assertion, incorporated into the agency's official benefit-cost calculations, that
corporate investment would be drawn to Timberlake New Town by the particular
transportation combination, at the Tellico Project's midpoint, of a railroad line, inter-
state highway access, and a barge terminus. See TELLICO DAM AND RESERVOIR, STAFF
REPORT TO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES COMMITTEE (Jan. 19, 1979). The latter required
a Tellico reservoir and canal. As it happened, the barge terminal lies choked in
weeds, and appears today, after twenty years, to have been used only once, by a TVA
dredging barge.
22. As early as 1894, Cyrus Thomas of the Bureau of Ethnology, a branch of the
Smithsonian Institution, observed, "The valley of the Little Tennessee River from
where it leaves the Smoky [Miountains which form the boundary between North Car-
olina and Tennessee, to where it joins the Tennessee River in Loudon County, is un-
doubtedly the most interesting archeological section in the entire Appalachian
district." Endangered Species-Part 2: Hearing on H.R. 10833 Before the Subcommit-
tee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Commit-
tee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 668 (1978) (exhibit taken
from National Register of Historic Places).
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est earth in the nation, USDA Class One and Two soils, virtually
all of which would be eliminated by the reservoir.
Environmental analysis should seek to make economic sense-ben-
efits, costs, and alternatives. The project's environmental oppo-
nents determined early that they would have to do more than
merely oppose the dam and reservoir. Instead, as so often occurs
in environmental cases, to have a realistic chance of prevailing in
the long run they had to base their position on a comprehensive
conceptual benefit-cost-alternatives accounting. On one hand the
Tellico citizens group reviewed the purported benefits of the reser-
voir-recreation, an uncertain model city's industrial develop-
ment on condemned lands, and minor claimed benefits in water
supply, flood control, and hydroelectric capacity-and found them
on the objective record to be quite insubstantial. Viewed in busi-
nesslike terms, the dam project was an economic basket case.
They then looked at the purported costs of the project, arguing
that the true costs extended beyond the Authority's costs for ce-
ment, fill dirt, land condemnation, and roads and bridges. A real-
istic accounting of the true social costs would have to include the
loss of all the special qualities of the river valley that had made it
a treasure over the centuries. The river was a major recreational
resource on its own terms, even before it had been rendered a vir-
tually unique resource by the impoundment of 2500 linear miles of
river in the surrounding region. The agricultural soils of the val-
ley were of great economic value, the historic resources held great
public value in their own right and could be capitalized monetarily
in a tourist-based development if the valley's central portion was
not flooded, and a major parcel of upriver project lands had partic-
ular potential for use as an access and overflow management area
for the Great Smoky Mountains National Park. The citizens' ben-
efit-cost accounting thus included extensive consideration of de-
velopment alternatives.
With increasing sophistication over the years the citizens ar-
gued for a comprehensive river-based development project, al-
lowing displaced families to go back onto most of the rich
agricultural lands of the valley, developing a tourist highway
through the valley to the Park, developing recreation to promote
canoe float trips and other water-based sports, improving access
to the superb trout fishing resource, and providing for two indus-
trial parks along the river at locations where they would not dis-
turb the other qualities of the valley. And over the years the
citizens' analysis of the project consistently proved more accurate
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than the TVA's projections in every expert review that took place
during the course of the controversy.
Dogging the citizens' steps from the start, however, was the
fundamental fact that we were missing the point. With the Tellico
Dam, as with many environmentally destructive projects and pro-
grams, environmental activists have felt obliged to address the
purported public purposes of the project and attempt to refute
them, presenting alternatives that would better achieve the
agency's purported economic objectives. But the true objectives
motivating the project internally and within the water project es-
tablishment in Washington were not its alleged public purposes,
but rather internal institutional drives to keep agency morale and
momentum rolling, to win federal appropriations, and to build lo-
cal and national political capital. 23
Early in the process we tried to persuade contacts within TVA
to get the agency to enter into mediation with us on Tellico. At the
time Chief Justice Burger was prodding attorneys to seek negoti-
ated win-win conflict resolutions outside the crowded courts. But
our main contact inside TVA told me, "It will never happen. Red
Wagner and his boys will never go into a mediation where all the
facts and alternatives are laid out on the table. If they did, the
rational conclusion would be all too obvious-some kind of devel-
opment plan without a dam. But my bosses think they'll beat you
if they can play their own game." Why did the leadership react so
strongly against considering our alternative vision for the valley?
"Look, Zyg, it's male menopause. These guys came down here as
young reformers, a lot of them from Cambridge. They came here
to lift a primitive region out of its backwardness. Now thirty
years later when some of the locals start to have their own ideas
about how the region should be developed, these guys get hot
flashes. The children are bucking their betters. The leadership
can't abide the thought that you might win." It was clear, he said,
once TVA had decided what was best for the valley and for the
agency itself, it would brook no opposition.
Our attempts to refute the project on its claimed rationales
were indeed missing the point. Underlying internal institutional
political reasons were carrying the project onward without regard
to its actual public economics or logic. Only by forcing trans-
parency, bringing the debate out into a publicly visible analytical
23. See generally WILLIAM ASHWORTH, UNDER THE INFLUENCE: CONGRESS, LOB-
BIES, AND THE AMERICAN PORK BARREL SYSTEM (1981).
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forum where civic public merits can predominate, could we hope to
sidestep the power of the insider establishment that did not care
about those merits.
Citizen statutory enforcement can create a governmental forum
where none exists. The problem the citizens faced is that in our
legal system there is no established forum in which public interest
advocate outsiders can reliably trigger official analytical scrutiny,
no way to obtain an accounting, even if on its merits a project is
demonstrably irrational and destructive. There is no entity
within the administrative and legislative processes that reliably
provides a roving commission seeking out ongoing agency or eco-
nomic initiatives that need review.24 Courts for their part like-
wise do not willingly take on the role of project and program
scrutiny.
But it may be different where citizens can find and prove a
substantive statutory violation in court, forcing the other
branches of government to take account of the larger questions.
Without an endangered fish, the American system of governance
provided no mechanism for addressing and rectifying the ongoing
mistakes of the Tellico Dam. With a fish, the dam ultimately got
the highest-level economic review in the history of the American
pork barrel system.
In October 1974, second-year law student Hank Hill (yes, that
Hill) walked into his environmental law professor's office and told
how his grad student buddies' ichthyology professor had just
found a small, hitherto-unknown perch, an endangered species, on
a large set of shoals at Coytee Springs smack in the middle of the
Tellico project, a fish that apparently existed only here because it
had been extirpated in every other big river habitat in the South-
east by dams. "Do you think that is enough of a topic for a ten-
page term paper?" I said I thought it would be.
At a hastily called meeting at Old Fort Loudon the next Sat-
urday night, a contingent of us from the University of Tennessee
College of Law asked the farmers and other local citizens who had
lost an earlier National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) fight 25
whether they wanted to fight the dam once more. Should the bat-
24. Senator Proxmire used to issue annual Golden Fleece Awards to projects and
programs he identified as wasteful, but that maverick process was scarcely a "forum"
for review, and the good Senator and his awards are no longer with us.
25. Envtl. Def. Fund v. TVA, 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn. 1973), aff/d, 492 F.2d
466 (6th Cir. 1974).
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tered little coalition pull together and try once more, using the
Endangered Species Act (ESA)?
The facts and the law seemed clear, we said. If you parsed
Section 7 of the ESA of 1973 carefully, there were at least two
causes of action hidden within its verbal foliage. Eliding the itali-
cized words that follow, once we got the species and its critical
habitat listed, we could assert two separate violations:
INTERAGENCY COOPERATION
The Secretary [of Interior] shall review other programs adminis-
tered by him and utilize such programs in furtherance of the
purposes of this chapter. All other federal departments and
agencies shall in consultation with and with the assistance of
the Secretary, utilize their authorities in furtherance of the pur-
poses of this chapter while carrying out programs for the conser-
vation of endangered species and threatened species listed
pursuant to section 1533 of this title, and by taking such actions
necessary to insure that any actions authorized, funded, or car-
ried out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered or threatened species or result in the destruction or
modification of habitat of any species which is determined by
the Secretary, after consultation as appropriate with the af-
fected States, to be critical.26
The dam would eliminate the entire known population of
darters, and destroy their critical habitat. The statute was vio-
lated and so an injunction should issue. Asa McCall, old and griz-
zled, who for months had been holding off the TVA condemnation
marshals with his dog and his shotgun and the presence of a news
photographer, looked around the room and said, "I've never before
heard of this little fish, but if it can save our farms, I say let's give
it a try." He passed his hat around the room and the $29 collected
in it that night was the seed money for the snail darter campaign.
Before commencing the legal process, however, we called Joe
Sax asking his advice. Citizen enforcement actions can be criti-
cally useful civic initiatives, but can also be crude unguided mis-
siles that backfire, blow up, hit the wrong targets, or for a host of
other reasons should never have been launched in the first place.
Should we launch a case that would obviously be so open to ridi-
cule, especially at first impression, potentially undercutting the
ESA itself and by extension giving anti-regulationists a political
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (as it stood in 1973) (emphasis added).
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tool against all environmental laws? When he heard about the
economics and common sense of the case, however, Sax said,
"Sounds reasonable to me. I'd say try it." So, from the beginning,
the campaign was Saxist: The citizen litigation aimed to get a
statutory enforcement injunction, which would shift the matter to
Congress to resolve the impasse-a "remand to the legislature"27
where the facts of the case could finally be seen and analyzed in a
public forum and the case resolved upon the real public merits.
Let us observe the politics within the case as it progressed,
viewing politics here in the context of people, structures, and
tendencies.
Localism. Note that it was important from the beginning that the
citizen group enforcing the ESA against the Tellico Dam was
deeply based within the locality. Localism is a dominant consider-
ation in most environmental controversies. It just would not have
worked to have this case launched and carried on by a handful of
people based in the university wearing Earth Shoes and turtle-
neck sweaters. It was practically and politically essential that the
coalition included farmers who were defending their homes and
land, Cherokee Indians who had an ancestral tie to the place, and
a variety of people who were well known in the locality as person-
ally invested and committed to the valley and the river. Without
them the venture could have been dismissed as doubly superfi-
cial-an insignificant fish represented by 6litists with no signifi-
cant linkage to the place or the controversy-and thus politically
illegitimate.
The legal chronology of the case moved through three stages:
The official listing of the species, statutory enforcement in court,
and the defense of the statutory injunction and the Act against
political backlash. Without the official listing of the species and
its critical habitat nothing else in the legal process would follow.
Once the species was listed, the question was whether the statute
would be enforced against the Tellico Dam, and by whom? And
after the injunction was issued, how would it be defended in the
political process against a powerful and foreseeable backlash?
27. Ultimately Professor Sax's concept of "remand to the legislature" was cited in
our Supreme Court brief and may well have been the argument that swung Chief
Justice Burger's vote. "[Tihe role of courts is not to make public policy, but to help
assure that public policy is made by the appropriate entity. . . ." Brief for Respondent
at 44 n.38, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (No. 76-1701) (quoting JOSEPH L. SAX,
DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR CITIZEN ACTION 151 (1970)). - ,
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Getting the Fish Officially Listed
Soon after the meeting in the old fort, our little group and
biologists from the university put together a package of data dem-
onstrating that this previously unidentified fish was a separate
species, clearly threatened by the dam. The packet was sent off to
the Office of Endangered Species, in the Department of Interior's
Fish and Wildlife Service, and we asked for an emergency listing.
Hesitancy within the regulatory bureaucracy, and 5 U.S.C. section
553(e), the rule-petitioning provision of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act. Within two days we received word through an inform-
ant in the Department of the Interior that the package of
information looked good, solid, biologically accurate. So would the
Department proceed on an expedited basis to list the fish? The
answer was a sympathetic but emphatic no. "We never have done
one of these emergency listings, and it's quite clear that this case
is going to be controversial, so no one here is going to stick their
neck out to start this process anytime soon."
The construction agency, the Tennessee Valley Authority,
however, would have no such hesitation about acting. Every week
and month that the listing was delayed would mean just so many
more trees and farms eliminated from the valley. "Can we peti-
tion you ourselves to put the listing process in motion?" "I don't
see why not. It's never been done, but citizens have the right to
petition the government, I guess."
Later that week, January 25, 1975, we designed and put to-
gether a formal petition to force the agency to list, using 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(e), a useful and under-used leveraging tool that allows citi-
zen petitioners to frame a proposed rule in their own chosen terms
and perhaps to leverage an agency out of its bureaucratic iner-
tia.28 How do you design a petition to list a species? There was no
form. We invented a five-point document. The first allegation as-
serted that "1. The fish currently known as the snail darter ex-
ists... ." which seemed to be a logical way to start. The attached
exhibit showed a photograph of the fish and three pages of scien-
tific description recounting in excruciating detail what this darter
looked like and how it was different from all other members of the
darter family. The second section asserted that the fish, as far as
28. Once it receives a § 553(e) petition, an agency must act on it within a reasona-
ble amount of time, and if it rejects the petition it must, under § 555(e), explain the
rational basis for doing so, which then provides an opportunity for the citizens to chal-
lenge the denial under the arbitrary and capricious judicial review test of § 706.
17
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was known, existed only within the Little Tennessee River Valley
within the Tellico Project area. The third section asserted that
the darter's existing habitat appeared to be critical to the continu-
ing existence of the species. The fourth section showed that the
Tellico Project would destroy the snail darter. The final point was
that "TVA knows about the fish, its threatened status, and the
Act, but continues with its timber clearing, excavating, and con-
struction," with a letter from TVA's chief executive saying that
they would not halt their ongoing activities. This amateurish pe-
tition turned out to be a sufficient scientific and logical basis to
launch the rulemaking process on its way toward listing the spe-
cies and its critical habitat.
"Multi-centric" government: citizen enforcement: governmental ac-
tors do not just automatically get under way when the facts and
statutes require them to. Note already a basic political lesson. The
administrative process often inclines toward inertia. To make
statutory enforcement happen in settings that are politically-
charged or burdensome, citizens often have to invest the time and
effort to make it happen. The availability of citizen enforcement
in American public law since the 1960s29 has been a major factor
in shifting government toward a multi-centric pluralism, away
from the traditional bipolar model of governance (in which on one
hand the marketplace provides the society's pervasive, sustaining
internal drive, and government on the other hand protects citizens
and society from the marketplace's excesses). This is not to say
that all citizen initiatives are logical or wise, because citizen en-
29. Beginning in the 1960s a host of environmental statutes replicated the citizen
enforcement provisions of the civil rights acts, and the litigation that followed built
environmental law. See Toxic Substances Control Act § 19(d), 20(c)(2), 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 2618(d), § 2619; Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 11(g)(4), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1540(g)(4);
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C.A. § 1270(d);
Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act § 117(c), 30 U.S.C.A. § 1427(c); Clean
Water Act (Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 505), 33
U.S.C.A. § 1365(d); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1415(g)(4); Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1515(d); Safe Drinking Water
Act § 1449(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-8(d); Noise Control Act of 1972 § 12(d), 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 4911(d); Energy Sources Development Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5851(e)(2); Energy Policy
and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6305(d); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 6972(e); Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7604, 7607(f); Powerplant and Indus-
trial Fuel Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8435(d); Ocean Thermal Energy Conservation Act, 42
U.S.C.A. § 9124(d); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1349(a)(5). Most
of these also provide for attorney and expert witness fee awards to the extent plain-
tiffs prevail. ZYGMUNT PLATER, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY: NATURE, LAw
& SOCIETY 403 n.31 (2d ed., West 1998) [hereinafter PLATER, ET AL., NATURE, LAW &
SocIETY].
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forcement can be problematic. But the snail darter case demon-
strates a setting where a situation that merited statutory
enforcement required citizen efforts because the appropriate agen-
cies were unable to act. Our informant within the Fish and Wild-
life Service's Office of Endangered Species recounted the agency's
great internal consternation. Our listing petition looked impreg-
nable, and that meant trouble. "My boss says we are going to
move slow on this. He says you're the enemy, you're going to
wreck the Act." Representatives of Senate Minority Leader How-
ard Baker of Tennessee and John Stennis, senior senator from
Mississippi, were applying heavy pressure to halt the listing in its
tracks.
The extraordinary usefulness of inside informants, and a note on
killifish. This communication from inside the Office of Endan-
gered Species emphasizes how important it is to have contacts
within the system who can provide straight and relevant informa-
tion without going through formal channels. Such contacts are de-
veloped through effort or luck. In this case the staffer was a
biologist who had personal connections to the University of Ten-
nessee through a network of ichthyology and herpetology scien-
tists. It was important that the inside informant and the citizens
on the outside knew and could trust one another, because the ac-
tion of an individual government employee in such a highly-
charged political setting can create career-ending indiscretions if
the contact is publicized. 30 And make no mistake, the snail darter
case was quickly identified as politically charged. People in the
Department of Interior bureaucracy were not eager to be identi-
fied as taking the initiative to list and protect endangered species.
As one participant explained, "most agency employees are killi-
fish." Like those large schools of little fish you see swimming by
the thousands, instantly shifting together, left and right, as they
move through the water, the fundamental strategy of survival is
to blend in with the mass, not to stand out. What happens to the
fish that is larger, or faster, or different from the rest? That fish
stands out and is targeted by the ever-present predators. Within
30. By the time the snail darter controversy had passed through four more years
of legal process, three other special contacts had played indispensable roles in shut-
tling information back and forth between Washington and Tennessee, often involving
surreptitious communications, "midnight phone calls," and in each case we took elabo-
rate precautions to remain discreet, to the extent of using four different cover names
so that sign-in sheets at the entrances to federal agencies and phone logs would not
reveal that these staffers were talking with the controversial Tennessee citizen
outsiders.
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the civil service it is often safer not to be known as a person who is
particularly energetic in enforcing the national policies embodied
within a controversial statute.
The Power of Pork. What did it mean that Senator Stennis was
leaning on the biologists of Interior's Office of Endangered Spe-
cies? It marked the appearance of a major political force that sub-
sequently launched a successful long-term guerilla war against
our implementation of the Endangered Species Act. Stennis was
Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and he repre-
sented the power of the pork barrel. The pork barrel is an extraor-
dinarily powerful and complex structure of alliances throughout
Congress and beyond, driven by annual expenditures of billions of
taxpayer dollars ladled up by appropriations committees in both
chambers and poured out into projects and programs in congres-
sional districts across the United States. Water projects consti-
tute one of the oldest and most powerful pork barrels, in which
TVA is a junior partner. Senator Baker had been able to pull in
Senator Stennis not because the Tellico Dam in and of itself was a
major federal project, but because our challenge to Tellico Dam
potentially posed a threat to water projects all over the country.
"The real problem for Stennis is not Tellico, but Tenn-Tom,"
said our informant, whom we will call Chuck Cook. The Tennes-
see-Tombigbee Waterway just then getting underway was a quin-
tessential pork barrel project with a budget of four billion dollars,
a totally unprecedented pork budget for that time. The Corps of
Engineers proposed literally to move mountains to build a barge
channel running from the Tennessee River through the mountains
of Northern Alabama down to Mobile on the Gulf, creating in ef-
fect a second Mississippi River. What threat did the ESA pose?
Chuck told us that soon after the snail darter story broke his office
had been asked for information on endangered species in this
Northern Alabama corridor, and had identified four fish and mol-
lusk species that were threatened by the Tenn-Tom. Tenn-Tom,
like most of the dozens of authorized pork barrel water projects,
could not withstand the transparency of having its economics
scrutinized in a public forum. If the Act's mandatory provisions
could force judicial and political scrutiny of these water projects,
then our little fish from Tennessee could embarrass a sprawling
mass of federal largesse programs starting with Tenn-Tom. The
darter was politically endangered not only by TVA, the agency
that wanted to eliminate its Little Tennessee River habitat, but
also by the hornets' nests it would stir up throughout many other
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regions of the country. Facing this prospect, the pork barrel be-
came a powerful and implacable foe operating within the central
precincts of the political process.
This episode also underscored the political difference between
appropriations committees and the regular committees of Con-
gress. The appropriations committees wielded the power of pork.
The subject matter committees-which pass and amend all the
substantive regulatory laws on natural resources, agriculture, pol-
lution, public health, historic preservation, as well as budget,
banking, government operations, courts and the judiciary, labor,
securities, and all the rest-are more erratic. In the daily politics
of Washington it seemed to us that the appropriations committees
were far more feared, a conclusion underscored by the official
rules that prevent appropriations committee members from sit-
ting on any other committee, and forbid making substantive law
changes on money bills. Appropriations committees, unlike the
regular committees, meet each and every year, supervising every
agency and allocating funds through an array of subcommittees
that almost exactly replicate the regular committees. Appropria-
tions committees can virtually nullify a statute by eliminating its
financing. The allocative ability to pour or block a flow of federal
dollars into every congressional district in the nation gives appro-
priations committee members almost peremptory power. Mem-
bers of the regular committees only revisited the statutes within
their jurisdiction when opportune moments to do so presented
themselves. The regular committees, however, especially their
committee and subcommittee chairmen, sometimes care a lot
about protecting their political turf. If you can show them that the
pork committees are interfering with something they think is in
their area of jurisdiction, you sometimes can get them jealous
enough to fight about it.
The "sunk cost" strategy of project promoters facing statutory en-
forcement. The Department of Interior's reluctance to act con-
trasted with TVA's eagerness to build. In the months after the
darter petition was filed TVA accelerated its efforts to condemn
homes, build levees and reservoir bridges, bulldoze farm buildings
and scalp trees from the project area. The agency chose to begin
its "land treatment"-tree cutting and scraping-at Coytee
Springs, the historic site on the riverbank marking the shoal that
was the snail darter's prime natural habitat. The bulldozing be-
gan surreptitiously before dawn. By sunrise all the trees had been
cut at Coytee Springs and a cascade of mud poured out into the
21
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river, covering for a time the endangered species' spawning and
feeding habitat. Over the next months TVA crews worked two and
then three shifts a day, under portable floodlights through the
night, so as to spend as much money as possible and eliminate as
much of the valley's homes, barns, and vegetation as quickly as
possible.
What was going on here? It was the "sunk cost" strategy.3 1
Project promoters in the public and private sectors often under-
standably wish to get as much physically accomplished and as
much money invested in a venture before their project is con-
fronted in a legal forum. The first law of bureaucracy, public or
private, is that "a rolling stone gathers momentum." The object is
to get the project to a point where the defenders are demoralized
and the promoter can argue "it's too late to turn back now," either
because the issue is legally moot, or at the very least that a bal-
ance of equities will at that point tilt in favor of continuing the
process: "Regretfully, too much has been done; too much money
spent; too little of value remains to permit consideration of alter-
natives at this late date." The sunk cost phenomenon recurs often
in environmental law. In Nashville, 150 miles to the west, the
Overton Park case had provided a vivid example where the federal
and state departments of transportation consciously knocked
down houses and built the interstate highway up to the very edge
of the legally-protected park, so as to be able to say then that it
regrettably was no longer feasible and prudent to go anywhere but
straight through the park.32 Here in the Tellico Dam case, as the
citizens attempted to navigate the legal process of protecting the
fish, it was continually disheartening and distressing to observe
TVA's weekly progress of destruction in the valley, so clearly in-
tended to forestall public policy considerations of any project con-
figuration other than a dam and reservoir. Simultaneously TVA
began to capture darters from the major breeding shoals and
transplant them to locations elsewhere in Tennessee.
Faced with TVA's accelerated efforts to moot the issue, where
could we turn? The Department of the Interior's reluctance to list
the species showed the enforcement agency's weakness. Our in-
side contact indicated that the Fish and Wildlife Service regarded
31. See David E. Cole, Note, Judicial Discretion and the "Sunk Costs" Strategies of
Government Agencies, 30 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. (forthcoming April 2003).
32. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); PLATER
ET AL., NATURE, LAw & SOCIETY, supra note 29, at 391 n.15. Part of the drama of that
case is that it is one of just a few sunk cost cases where the ploy did not work.
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the petition for listing as "a nightmare." The agency was being
pushed into a situation "which could destroy the entire Endan-
gered Species Act; as far as the Fish and Wildlife Service is con-
cerned, you people in Tennessee are the enemy." This was not
necessarily an irrational reaction on the part of the Department of
Interior. Unlike the citizens, the Department had to function over
time in a complex political setting where the anger of the public
works pork barrel coalitions could be politically disastrous. And
some of Interior's own divisions were charter members of the pub-
lic works pork barrel, including the Bureau of Reclamation and
the Bureau of Land Management.
The Office of the President: CEQ? We went to the Council of Envi-
ronmental Quality (CEQ) in the Office of the President. There
was some reason to be hopeful about CEQ. We had chanced to see
a magazine quotation from Lee Talbot, a senior staffer in both
Nixon and Ford's CEQ commenting that "in some cases an endan-
gered species may be more important to the nation than a particu-
lar dam and reservoir project." Nixon was our most environmen-
tal President, measured by the number of statutes he signed into
law.33 But in his last two years, a substantial anti-regulatory in-
dustrial backlash had mounted against the new array of environ-
mental statutes, and Nixon quickly backed off, trying to impound
money allocated for enforcement of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act. Gerald Ford, his accidental successor, did not have a
clear idea whether or not he was an environmentalist. When we
visited with Lee Talbot at CEQ he rapidly distanced himself from
his comment about endangered species and dams, knowing that
this was a highly sensitive issue and that he and CEQ lacked the
ability to pursue the matter.
An introduction to Congress and the dirty little secret of govern-
ment. The citizens groups in Washington advised us to find pres-
sure points within Congress. Congress is not a monolith but an
assemblage of 535 volatile and potentially potent leverage points.
Trekking through a variety of congressional offices, we located a
pressure point in the office of the chairman of the Merchant
Marine and Fisheries Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife.
The subcommittee counsel had been a key player in the original
33. There were thirty-four important environmental statutes passed in the three
years after the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. PLATER, ET AL., NATURE,
LAW & SOCIETY (2d. ed. 2001-02 Teacher's Manual Annual Update 355-57) (historical
statutory appendix). Only Jimmy Carter's years come close, with twenty in an
equivalent span, many of which were merely perfecting amendments. Id. at 357-58.
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passage of the ESA. "You have to understand," he told us. "Most
members of Congress never read the bills they vote on, and this
one was no exception. Only a few members and a few of us staff-
ers had any idea the Act could be used to stop destructive
projects." Another staffer chimed, "Even if they know what these
bills say, the dirty little secret of government, as you'll find out, is
that just because legislatures pass a law doesn't mean they really
intend that it be implemented. A lot of do-good laws are just sym-
bolic reassurance to the public that the legislature is on top of
things. If you want to know what legislators really want, look at
where they appropriate the money.
ESA enforcement appropriations were trivial. The subcom-
mittee counsel and Rep. John Dingell for whom he had worked,
however, clearly had wanted Section 7 of the ESA to wield its hid-
den teeth eventually. "But we hoped the first case to come up
would involve whooping cranes or bald eagles, not something that
sounds silly." After working through the common sense details of
the case with us, however, the counsel agreed to help. The sub-
committee chairman would push Interior to list the darter by
threatening the Department with oversight hearings on imple-
mentation of the ESA, with pointed reference to the listing process
and the snail darter case. He also advised us to threaten a citizen
lawsuit to force the agency to list the endangered species, a sug-
gestion we received several times over the years from within the
agencies as well, 3 4 a process which, if we had to do it, would be as
difficult as it was unprecedented.
This push and advice from the subcommittee were effective.
The double threat of peremptory oversight hearings and a citizen
lawsuit highlighting the non-listing of species finally prompted
Under-Secretary Nathaniel Reed to sign a notice of proposed rule
making in October 1975, and by the end of the year the darter and
its critical habitat were officially listed.
Enforcing the Law in Court
When Big Government cannot do the job... A listing under the
ESA, however, is not self-enforcing. TVA was continuing land
clearance on an accelerated schedule, and given that it would not
34. On at least two other occasions we received earnest requests from within an
agency to "please sue us, and then we can go to our boss and tell him we have to do
what we should already be doing in the first place." In the face of strong economic and
political coalitions in the marketplace economy, agencies sometimes cannot or will not
readily implement the counter-marketplace roles they were designed to play unless
freed to do so by countervailing threats from civic forces like citizen lawsuits.
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voluntarily reconsider its ongoing project, who now would enforce
the Act against Tellico Dam? Not Congress, not the President,
and, as it turned out, not Interior. Again the political setting
ultimately required the citizens to take on the work of law
enforcement.
What can one federal agency do against another federal
agency in a situation like this where one is the regulator and the
other stands in the position of a violator? The TVA sent delegation
after delegation of its staffers to Washington to "consult" with
the Department of Interior, but the point of that consultation
throughout was to back Interior off from any threat of legal action
by arguing that the Act did not apply to ongoing projects and shift-
ing the discussion to transplantation, putting the endangered fish
somewhere, anywhere, else. From the beginning, Chuck Cook told
us, TVA took the position with Interior that it would talk until
everyone is blue in the face about trying to find natural popula-
tions elsewhere or transplanting the fish somewhere else, but TVA
would simply not discuss the possibility that its dam project would
not be completed on schedule.
Where was the Department of Interior? Under political pres-
sure, it was shrinking away from the mandates of the Act. Implic-
itly refuting the charge that federal agencies are constantly
seeking to expand their powers, Interior tried to compromise the
Act by proposing draft regulations that narrowed the range of its
authority,35 interpreting Section 7 as applying only prospectively,
to future federal actions, not to ongoing projects. Interior was
clearly not willing to initiate administrative or judicial proceed-
ings against TVA, although it attempted a series of gestures in the
direction of enforcement. Pressured by us the FWS began denying
permits for transplantation of the fish away from the river. They
created a paper trail in departmental files detailing how TVA had
been repeatedly informed that its activities were likely to jeopard-
ize the continued existence of the species. But it became evident,
confirmed by our inside contacts, that when confronted by the po-
litical phalanx of TVA and its allies, the Department of Interior-
35. 42 Fed. Reg. 4868-4869. (Jan. 26 1977). Politically it is not unheard of for
agencies to narrow their jurisdiction by restrictively interpreting the statutory lan-
guage. EPA interpreted groundwater out of the Clean Water Act to avoid that regula-
tory snarl, requiring Congress later to pass the Safe Drinking Water Act. In one
amusing anecdote, EPA and the Corps each tried to interpret the massive dumping of
automobile tires into Connecticut wetlands as being within the other agency's CWA
jurisdiction, each hoping to avoid a problem area with low enforcement appeal, high
volume, and Mafia entanglements.
25
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
with 86,000 employees and a budget of three billion dollars-had
made a conscious decision to rely on us citizens-a motley little
group of maybe thirty-five activist students, farmers, fishermen,
and a law professor in the process of being discharged-to enforce
the federal Act against TVA.
Into the judicial process. The case went to trial in April of 1986.
The forum offered by the court, however, was far narrower than
an environmentalist would have hoped. In this litigation, as in
many others, the courts at each level strenuously avoided inquiry
into the practical public merits of the question. To a generation
steeped in the lore of activist courts stretching to take on major
public issues, our case was a reminder that the judiciary can just
as easily incline toward a constricted definition of their role. De-
spite asserting that the subsequent holding was based on a "bal-
ance of equities," the trial court refused to allow any evidence of
existing project alternatives and allowed us to present only twenty
minutes of evidence on the reservoir's economics. The judge would
not defer to Interior's findings that the darter was endangered in
its critical habitat, so actual proof of endangerment was an impor-
tant part of the case, though he quashed our subpoena for testi-
mony from the expert Interior biologist.36 In any event, the trial
court ultimately found that the darter was a species endangered
by the destruction of its critical habitat and that was enough. The
trial court failed to issue an injunction, but that oversight was rec-
tified on appeal.
In the Sixth Circuit and the Supreme Court, given the lack of
a trial record on the contesting economics and equities of the case,
we successfully argued Sax's remand to the legislature theory:
When two contrary statutory directives collide, the job of the
courts is not to jump in and arrogate to themselves the power to
strike intuitive bargains, but rather simply to enjoin the violation.
This legal argument was a political argument as well. No envi-
ronmental plaintiff should want to argue for a legal proposition
that produces an irrational and irresolvable stalemate. Our argu-
ment was that although the facts were complex, there were com-
36. We had expected that Interior would authorize its biologists to travel to the
trial to testify on the accuracy and substantiality of its own listing, but it did not.
When TVA quashed our subpoena seeking an Interior biologist's testimony, Interior
required him to take personal vacation leave to come to testify. It is unusual that
TVA, the defendant, and not the federal agency being subpoenaed to testify, was able
to quash the subpoena. It forced the witness to admit that he personally volunteered
to testify, which TVA used to imply bias.
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mon sense resolutions that could be legislated, but not by judges
who should be passive, not activists. The courts' job was to main-
tain the status quo by injunction, which as a practical matter
would shift the conflict to Congress where ideally the conflict
would finally achieve transparency, be debated, and be resolved in
an enlightened democratic process.37
Backlash: Defending a Statutory Enforcement Initiative in the Po-
litical Process
A hot potato in the bureaucracy. Jimmy Carter was inaugurated
on January 12, 1977, and nineteen days after the outsider neo-
phyte entered the White House, the Sixth Circuit presented his
young Administration with a very hot potato in the form of the
injunction blocking Tellico Dam for violating the Endangered Spe-
cies Act. The newspapers and broadcast media seized on the case,
covering it as an example of environmentalism gone nuts, wonder-
ing how the new administration, with a President who had run as
a citizen environmentalist, would handle it. Would the adminis-
tration, with the powerful momentum that comes from a fresh
election victory, back us and the ESA and change the political to-
pography of the case? Some improvements seemed inevitable.
The Schedule C political appointees whom the President chooses
for the top ranks of the Cabinet agencies and the White House's
voluminous staff could make a marked difference in policy formu-
lation and agency planning for statutory implementation. A wave
of environmentalists was moving into the top ranks of the federal
agencies, including Cecil Andrus, an environmentally progressive
Governor of Idaho named Secretary of the Interior, and Gus Speth
of the Natural Resources Defense Counsel and Marion Edey of the
Environmental Policy Center named to the President's Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ). Within a year Carter was also
able to name a new member to the three-person TVA Board.
But the nature of the executive branch is such that merely
changing the head does not necessarily change the mind of the
organism. Interior may have had a more environmentally em-
pathic leadership, but that may actually have weakened the De-
partment's political position, because the anti-regulatory bloc in
Congress identified the new people as threats. This message was
soon received by Secretary Andrus. As far as we could see the
pressure came from a number of his own divisions which included
37. See Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977), affd, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); SAx,
supra note 27, at 151.
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several pork barrel agencies, from outside where the political
pressure from lobbyists and members of Congress was starting to
be intense, and also from within the agency's vast ranks of civil
service careerists. It came as well from other federal agencies who
feared their programs might face serious legal difficulties from an
activated ESA, agencies like the Department of Agriculture (Agri-
culture) with its linkages to pesticide programs and its Forest Ser-
vice timber cutting programs, and the Department of Transporta-
tion with its interstate highway construction program. The Act
was a grenade, Andrus realized, that could destroy his policy aspi-
rations and tenure in office. Within a week he was making public
statements expressing tentative approval of the Ford Administra-
tion's proposed regulations defining the Act's coverage to extend
only to future actions, not to ongoing projects like Tellico Dam.
This hesitancy was understandable in bureaucratic survival
terms. The civil service and the top officials of Interior undoubt-
edly cared about the ESA as well as the agency's many other mis-
sions, but the Act's application to ongoing projects represented the
kind of political landmine that could severely hurt the Act as well
as the Department in general.
The Iron Triangle. Why was it so politically daunting for an
agency to enforce one of its own keynote statutes, we wondered?
"It's an iron triangle problem," said Fred Powledge, a public policy
writer who came to one of the American Rivers citizen participa-
tion workshops.38 "The Department of Interior is up against a
number of powerful iron triangles, and the water projects triangle
is one of the strongest." What is an iron triangle? Powledge ex-
plained it was a political science term for specialized political alli-
ances that take root within the federal government. Iron triangles
have three corners-one within the agencies, one within Con-
gress, and the third deep in the marketplace. In the water project
area you have an agency like TVA or the Corps that desires the
power and momentum that comes from building a public works
project with federal funds. Then in Congress you have the pork
committees and individual members of Congress who gain power,
votes, and campaign contributions by bringing infusions of federal
taxpayer dollars into their local districts. The third bloc is made
up of all the special interests that profit from the projects or pro-
38. See F. POWLEDGE, WATER: THE NATURE, USES, AND FUTURE OF OUR MOST PRE-
CIOUS AND ABUSED RESOURCE, 286-87 (Farrar, Straus, 1982), in which the author
gives Prof. George "Rock" Pring, now of the Univ. of Denver Law School, credit for the
"iron triangle" metaphor as applied to water project pork barrels.
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grams, which in the water project boondoggles includes the busi-
nesses that get the federal construction contracts, other industries
like barge transportation or irrigation businesses that in effect get
their operations federally subsidized for free, real estate interests
that can make windfalls by selling land to the agencies at a profit
or getting free improvements to land they own, state and local pol-
iticians who are given the opportunity to run development boards
or get to choose winners and losers in the details of project design,
chambers of commerce whose members will make money from the
windfall infusions of federal cash, and so on. It's a symbiosis.
All three corners of an iron triangle promote and protect each
other-a virtually unbeatable combination focused on launching
projects and keeping them rolling. A triangle, remember, is the
strongest geometric shape there is. The culmination of hundreds
of such projects forms a cohesive political structure, a national
Iron Triangle on public works construction built into the heart of
the governmental system. And the water triangle has analogs in
other areas of government. There are iron triangles for mining,
ranching, timber, transportation, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, de-
fense, and a host of other sectors. Many are linked together
through the appropriations process; others are formed through the
seduction or "capture" of regulatory agencies. None of them are
fond of environmentalists.
The mushroom syndrome. We saw a good example of iron triangle
pressure in the regulatory setting with the United States Forest
Service in the Department of Agriculture. Agriculture had been
one of the agencies expressing concern about endangered species
enforcement. Carter appointed Rupert Cutler, whom we had
known as a professor of environmental policy at Michigan State
University, to be an Assistant Secretary. He invited us to come
over to discuss the ESA. "You remember how you came to my
classroom last fall?" he asked. "I had forty-five students. Now I
have 20,000 employees in the U.S. Forest Service directly under
my command." We discussed how he could, among other policy
initiatives, integrate endangered species protection planning into
the management of the national forests. But Cutler's brains and
hard work within the Forest Service came up against coordinated
resistance within and outside his agency. A year later he was car-
ried out of the office on a stretcher with exhaustion and bleeding
ulcers. As he later explained, "I couldn't budge my own bureau-
cracy. They treated me like a mushroom. You know what I mean?
They kept me in the dark and fed me a lot of manure."
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It helps to have environmental groups, an 01' Girl Network, and a
friend in the White House. As it turned out, Interior's policy was
reversed, in part at least through the fortuity that we were given a
political introduction to the nascent Old Girl Network. The envi-
ronmental groups in Washington had greeted our case's arrival
with mixed enthusiasms, but most of them39 ultimately provided
advice, logistical support, and hundreds of hours of lobbying effort
for the ESA over the last three years of our fight. Their help was
critical. Their sophisticated presence in Washington had clearly
made a difference in assuring that the environment is seriously
considered in the daily politics of the capital. They gave us con-
nections as well as support in lobbying. Through Anne Wickham,
Conservation Director of Friends of the Earth, we were given an
entr6e to a nascent 01' Girl Network and soon connected with a
woman who was one of Andrus' top aides, so that the full facts of
the Tellico impasse began to be communicated to the Secretary
directly.
Even more important, Wickham introduced us to several peo-
ple on the White House staff, particularly Kathy Fletcher who was
working in Stuart Eizenstadt's Domestic Counsel. With the aid of
these staffers the Tellico case in all its ecological and economic
details became a White House case file. After the President had
been briefed, we were told, his good ol' Georgia buddy who was
chief of liaison with Congress, Bert Lance, exclaimed to Carter "I
hear they're talking about stopping that dam for a little minnow."
The President replied sternly, "I can't think of a better reason!" an
answer that was heartening to us as an indication of his personal
feelings, if not his understanding of the full facts of the case. We
had put a great deal of economic detail into the Domestic Council
case file to show the Administration that this purported example
of irrational environmental extremism could be reversed 180' and
used by the Administration to demonstrate that good ecology
makes for good economics. We thus hoped the Carter people
would use the facts of our case to validate not only the ESA, but
other environmental initiatives of the Administration as well. Af-
ter the intervention of the Domestic Council, doors did begin open-
39. The groups that regularly provided support for us and the defense of the ESA,
were Friends of the Earth, American Rivers, Environmental Policy Center, Sierra
Club, National Wildlife Federation, Trout Unlimited, World Wildlife Fund, and De-
fenders of Wildlife. Among our sagest mentors in Washington was 1998 Garrison
Lecturer Oliver Houck, then General Counsel and Vice President of the National
Wildlife Federation.
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ing to us within Interior. Interior's statements to TVA became
more emphatic. Transplantation away from the river was halted
completely, and in the congressional hearings in the summers of
1977 and 1978 the Administration took a position affirming the
workability of the Act and noting the intransigence of TVA in its
truncated "consultations" with Interior regarding the dam.40
The Press. The most significant political consequence of the Sixth
Circuit's injunction, however, was in the media. From the begin-
ning of the campaign we had hoped that the press would ulti-
mately give the case the perceptive scrutiny and transparent
public forum it desperately needed. From the moment the injunc-
tion was announced, however, the press focused only narrowly on
the story, the ironic disproportion of the "two-and-a-half-inch min-
now, discovered at the last moment by elitist environmentalists,
being used to stop a large multi-million dollar hydroelectric dam."
It did not matter that virtually every element of that caricature
was inaccurate. The story was too good to pass up. The press
from the beginning was sucked in by the beguiling clich6 of little-
fish-versus-big-dam into consistently framing the story through
the classically misleading epigram-"It's a tradeoff. You have to
choose: Will it be economic progress or environmental quality?
You can't have both." There was no second wave of revisionist sto-
ries revealing the dramatic fact that this dam did not pay, was a
wasteful federal land development boondoggle, and that the fish
was saving a valuable natural resource and millions of dollars for
America. The economic case for the darter never made it to the
newspapers and television screens of the United States.41 As re-
40. TVA remained truculent. Kathy Fletcher had been instrumental in pushing
the nomination by President Carter of David Freeman, an accomplished technocrat
with expertise and energy, who was extensively briefed on the Tellico Project before
his appointment to the Board. In the event, however, Freeman was a victim of inter-
nal TVA politics, because as one of three directors he could not shape policy, and even
when he was appointed Chairman, he suffered acutely within TVA, his own agency,
from Rupe Cutler's mushroom syndrome.
41. Our evolving rap on Tellico had five steps leading to an inexorable conclusion
that the dam project did not make rational economic or common sense while the op-
tions that preserved the darter did:
" Endangered species as canaries-in-the-coalmine-under the terms of
the Act the darter serves here as a sensitive natural indicator of
human welfare as well as ecology, identifying the threat posed by the
destructive ill-conceived project to pure, clean, fertile, habitat re-
source values that are of great potential worth to the human commu-
nity as well.
* Tellico is a recreational and land development project, not a power
dam.
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counted elsewhere, 42 the force and effect of this media coverage,
and the fact that it never changed over time, ultimately undercut
even a presidential veto.
Working with the executive. Having belatedly come to an active
support of our position, the Department of Interior, we noted, did
not know how to use us outsiders in the ongoing political defense
of the Act, and we had to push to stay within the process. At one
point, for example, we were permitted to sit in on a planning ses-
sion for the upcoming 1977 Senate hearings, which would be a sig-
nificant opportunity to defend the rational operation of the Act as
a whole. A review of the ESA over the prior three years would
probably show, we argued, that there had been dozens of potential
conflicts between the Act and federal projects over that time, and
good faith administrative process had crafted win-win resolu-
tions-alterations in technology, timing, scope, location, design,
and process, as well as developing mitigations, to avoid the con-
flicts. But the agency did not have that data compiled and were
not sure the task could or should be done. We had to push, and
the Fish & Wildlife Service finally agreed to give an office and
phones to two of our law students from Michigan. Mardi Hatcher
and Deborah Labelle volunteered the first part of their summer of
1977 pulling together what became the Carter Administration's
official record of what actually had been going on in interagency
implementation of Section 7 around the nation. By the end of
their research, Mardi and Debbie had put together a catalogue of
more than 4000 cases where field personnel reported potential
conflicts between the Act and federal agency actions, many of
0 300 plus farm families are being thrown off their prime agricultural
lands by federal condemnation to provide acreage for a hypothetical
Model City that TVA planned to develop with Boeing, a plan that was
abandoned in 1975 as economically irrational.
* Valuable river-based project development alternatives exist that would
save the darter and get the farmers back on their lands, and produce
far greater recreational, commercial, and tourism development bene-
fits than a dam.
0 TVA, however, consistently refuses to consider any options except their
original obsolete dam plan that will destroy the darter.
The conclusion that this analysis aimed at? That the snail darter case demonstrated
the ESA as a workable law that makes sense, which identifies important opportuni-
ties for necessary adjustments and protections for human welfare as well as wildlife.
But this analysis never received coverage or scrutiny in the press despite reams of
fish-dam stories, nor did it penetrate the congressional process that ultimately elimi-
nated the river.
42. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Law and the Fourth Estate: Endangered Nature, the
Press, and the Dicey Game of Democratic Governance, 32 ENVTL. L. 1 (2002).
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them trivial but dozens of them potentially serious. In subsequent
hearings this bureaucratic record proved to be extremely useful,
showing that of all those thousands of potential conflicts only
three had not been resolved, 43 all three demonstrating agency ob-
structionism rather than infeasibility of resolution through com-
promise and negotiation. But without the efforts of the two law
students the Carter Administration would not have had the data
on regulatory success necessary to defend the rationality of the
Act and its implementation.
OMB. Who were those guys? There were, however, moments of
greater effectiveness on the part of the Administration. At one
point when the Senate subcommittee had scheduled hearings fea-
turing a dozen federal agencies testifying on the Act, we citizens
working with the staff and the Administration were worried be-
cause most of the selected agencies were those tied to iron trian-
gles-in agriculture, interstate highway construction, mining,
grazing, and the like, as well as TVA whose adamant opposition to
implementation of the ESA was predictable. We asked our con-
tacts in the White House, "Do you realize that this testimony is
going to be a cascade of federal agencies bemoaning extreme re-
strictions on important national programs?" We were told not to
worry. Other than TVA's, the statements from all but two agen-
cies had been thoroughly vetted. They would not assert the inflex-
ibility and irrationality of the ESA, as originally drafted. TVA as
an independent agency and the party in ongoing Supreme Court
litigation would not be countermanded by the Administration.
Which two agencies had not been contacted? The Department of
Transportation and the Forest Service. Later that morning,
standing in the marble corridor outside the Russell Senate Office
Building hearing room, we were bemused to watch as two guys in
gray suits halted three Transportation officials as they strode up
the hall to enter the chamber. The two guys took Transportation's
draft statement, held it up against the wall, and with a magic
marker began to strike out paragraph after paragraph. When the
process was over the statement had little but a bland opening and
43. The three cases were the case of a Mississippi interstate highway planned to
go straight through the nesting area of the Mississippi Sandhill Crane, National
Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1976); a dam in Nebraska that
would eliminate critical areas of the whooping crane Midwest flyway, Nebraska v.
Rural Electrification Admin., 1978 WL 23470, 12 ERC 1156, 8 ELR 20789 (D. Neb.
1978), Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 23 F.3d 1336 (8th Cir. 1994) (both
concerning the Grayrocks Dam); and Tellico Dam.
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closing, with nothing between. The dejected Transportation
spokespersons, and later the Forest Service witnesses who went
through the same procedure, could only say to the committee
chairman that they were authorized to say their agency had no
quarrel with the public purposes of the ESA in general, they be-
lieved that implementation could be worked out over time to sat-
isfy the different statutory mandates, and they would have to
provide a clean copy of their statements at a later date.
Who were those two guys in gray suits? OMB. The Office of
Management and Budget has a special role in overseeing the
budget and finagling funding flows among the agencies, projects,
and programs of government that, despite changes in the congres-
sional budget process, retain substantial leverage for the Presi-
dent.44 When the President's Domestic Counsel decided the policy
of the Administration was to declare the ESA reasonable, the
OMB would enforce it with a magic marker against the marble
walls of Senate corridors if necessary. 45
Hearings can be parades with no destinations. After the agency
testimony the Senate hearings in 1977 and 1978 opened up a
parade of witnesses from across the country, and the national
politics of this issue quickly became apparent. Senator Garn
would introduce a small family rancher from Utah with fears
about the Act, Senator Packwood would introduce a small mill
owner from the Northwest lumber industry, and dozens more
came to testify against the Act. (It is interesting how the largest
industries try to find mediagenic little guys to represent their po-
sitions-the widow running a small ranch who fears protected
wolves eating her calves, the grizzled prospector worrying about
his grubstake mining claim, the Portuguese fishing family whose
mortgage depends on evading the quota, the homeowner who
44. See infra note 71.
45. This political phenomena was given a further twist when TVA Chairman
Wagner announced at the beginning of his testimony that the White House had spe-
cifically allowed him to proceed with testimony in opposition to the Act. Junior Sena-
tor Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming reacted with disbelief, asking whether that meant
that all the other agencies had given censored testimony to the Committee. Wagner
said that was so, but the rest of the Committee shushed Wallop, indicating to him
that this was a standard procedure when agencies testified. Agencies, particularly
those within the President's Cabinet, should be considered declarants of Administra-
tion policy, not witnesses sworn to tell what they really thought to the senators who
had invited them to testify. See Endangered Species Act Oversight Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Res. Prot. of the Senate Comm. on the Env't & Pub. Works, 92d Cong.
366-78 (1977) (discussion with federal witnesses noting that they can speak directly
only when directly asked for their real opinions).
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claims his house burned because endangered kangaroo rat habitat
prevented his clearing a firebreak, the under-employed logger who
fears protections for the spotted ow146-and we of course did too.)
The National Association of Homebuilders, the pulp and paper in-
dustry, the mining industry, the Edison Electric Institute-the
hearing docket reads like a roster of the National Association of
Manufacturers and their lobbying arms. The Pacific Legal Foun-
dation, an industry-funded "public interest law foundation" was
represented by sleek, silk-stocking attorneys testifying as to the
intractable irrationality of environmental protection regulations
exemplified by the Act. 47
The politics of Congressional Hearings in practice did not re-
flect the wistful premises of eighth grade civics textbooks. For us
observing the political process, perhaps the most important lesson
of the hearings was seeing what hearings did and did not accom-
plish. Hearings are a type of forum that has no necessary product
except the fact of having been held. Hearings are not calculated to
reach a "verdict." They are opportunities for just that, a "hear-
ing." The endangered species hearings in both Senate and House
produced significant opportunities for us citizens and our allies in
the environmental movement to present information about the
logical economic and empathic reasons for protecting endangered
species. It became clear quite quickly to the Committee staffers
on both the House Merchant Marines and Fisheries Committee
and the Senate Public Works and Environment Committee that
TVA's arguments did not withstand the light of scrutiny, and that
46. These examples are affecting to hearing audiences, though they often have a
skewed relationship to actuality. The kangaroo rat story was inaccurate on the re-
cord, more lumbermen would have their jobs under selective cutting than under
mechanized clear-cutting that most endangers species, etc.
47. See Amending the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Hearing on S. 2899 Before
the Subcomm. on Res. Prot. of the S. Comm. on the Env't & Pub. Works, 92d Cong.
248-52 (1978); Endangered Species, Part 2: Hearing Before the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine & Fisheries, 92d Cong. 849-56 (1978). This testimony was re-
vealing. Several days before the hearings we had extensive discussions with a Pacific
Legal Foundation (PLF) attorney in the national office showing that the endangered
species in the Tellico case was serving as the sole legal protection left for the private
property rights of farmers living in the valley being condemned for a development
project that was economically irrational as well as "socialistic" in putting TVA in the
land sale business. The PLF, we argued, should be on the side of private property and
economic integrity and against highhanded government agency condemnations. The
PLF's liaison on the issue, however, while accepting the validity of the data we sup-
plied from TVA and the GAO, sheepishly told us the Foundation could not reverse its
position based on the facts of the matter, because its political orientation on this issue
was obliged to be pro-industry and against implementation of environmental regula-
tion under the ESA. Their testimony excoriated our snail darter case.
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the citizen group from Tennessee had a full and sufficient answer
to all the allegations leveled against the fish. The trouble with a
hearing, however, is that the only people who "hear" are those who
happen to be in the room. A committee's hearings do not necessa-
rily attract even a majority of its own members. Sometimes there
would be only one or two members of the committee dutifully sit-
ting at the dais during the presentations. Given an array of com-
peting opportunities, members choose to come or not based on
some internal calculation of whether the session will be entertain-
ing or useful to them personally, and once a session is over in most
cases it is unlikely that anyone in Congress will ever again cast a
human eye upon the transcript or the written testimony scanned
into the official hearing record and published by the GPO.
The Press, again. Likewise the press. It was clear that one of the
major political functions of a hearing is the hope that it will at-
tract and focus news media reporting on a particular committee or
issue. Media attention is not automatic. It depends on the
"hooks" that are presented in the occasion-a big name witness, a
juicy twist that would be attractive to news audiences, a news cli-
mate building momentum, the infotainment character of the hear-
ing as it unfolded. 48 For us living the controversy, there were
deep pangs of jealousy walking down the corridors of the Capitol
seeing television cables and phone lines snaking out of the doors of
hearings deemed by the press to have sex appeal. Strangely, for a
story that repeatedly was treated as a cultural epigram-little
fish stops big dam-our hearings, which over time demonstrated
the solid economics of species protections and the dysfunctionality
of the case for the dam, did not register the same kind of press
attention. Perhaps they were a letdown, deflating the easy and
familiar fish-dam clich6. The press coverage of hearings was er-
ratic. The line up of agencies testifying that the Act was workable
on the actual administrative record was almost completely ig-
48. We heard about this need from colleagues at Syracuse's Newhouse School of
Public Communications when we asked them to explain how the press decided what
to cover in their papers and broadcasts. One said, 'Well, you have really asked The
Big Question. [Although] the short answer is: Nobody really knows, the 'standard'
answer seems to be 'Whatever they [or their editor] think their reader/viewer will be
interested in."' Most news departments, they said, use some version of a common list
of factors in deciding what to publish: Conflict, impact, interest (of audience), novelty,
prominence (people, institutions, etc), proximity, and timeliness. E-mails from Bar-
bara Croll Fought and Patricia H. Longstaff, Professors, Syracuse University, S.I.
Newhouse School of Public Communications, to David E. Cole, Research Assistant,
Boston College Law School (July 25, 2001) (on file with author).
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nored. That was not the story that had the infotainment buzz to
it. The press did, however, often pick up on piquant anecdotes
from witnesses brought to Washington by their respective indus-
tries to show more examples of the standard story frame, fish ver-
sus dam, species versus people, environmental protection versus
economic health. When a potential conflict surfaced in Maine be-
tween an endangered plant and the Army Corps of Engineers'
proposed Dickey-Lincoln Dam, the press jumped all over the ridic-
ulous-sounding name of "Furbish's lousewort," without focusing
on the merits of the project or the fact that it was the Army Corps,
not environmentalists, who announced and bannered the possible
ESA conflict.
The GAO and Gore of economic review. Frustrated by shallow
press coverage and lack of success in our attempts to find a forum
that would produce a convincing verdict on the economics of our
case, a smoking gun to present to the press, we followed up on a
sage suggestion relayed to us by Brent Blackwelder, the head of
American Rivers and the Environmental Policy Center. He sug-
gested we try to get an analytical review of Tellico economics from
the General Accounting Office (GAO). Like many attorneys then,
we had never heard of the General Accounting Office, and learned
that it was an arm of Congress which sometimes produced incisive
accounting studies of the economics and practicalities of contro-
verted cases if a chairman of a full committee signed a request
letter for such a study. We drafted a letter for the signature of the
Chairman of the House Merchant Marine Committee, who said he
would only sign it if we could get backing from a member of the
Tennessee delegation. 49
Finding a Tennessee representative who was willing to give
even just off-the-record backing for a reasonable economic study of
the merits of a TVA dam proved difficult. We went from office to
office and finally, under face-to-face exhortation from Tennessee
law student Hank Hill, Al Gore, Jr., a young freshman congress-
man from middle Tennessee who asserted a strong personal com-
mitment to rational environmental analysis, authorized us to
convey his oral backing for a GAO study to Chairman Murphy,
though he would not put it in writing. Waiting in the Chairman's
office with the unsigned letter in hand, I received the phone call
from Hill that Gore had given his OK. As I turned to go into the
49. Territorial localism exists in Congress as well, so that members tend to defer
to the local turf of House and Senate colleagues.
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committee hearing room carrying the verbal go-ahead for the
Chairman's signature, however, an urgent phone call rang onto
the switchboard. The person who took the call, a staffer whom I
knew and liked and who apparently knew and liked us, turned
with consternation on her face. "I have an urgent message from
Mr. Gore. He wants Chairman Murphy to know that he has just
told some Tennesseans they could say he supports a GAO study of
the Tellico Dam, but he does not in fact want that economic study
and asks Mr. Murphy please not to issue the request." The staffer
turned to me and said, "I'll give you five minutes, and then this
message gets delivered to Chairman Murphy." Dashing down the
corridor to the committee room, three minutes later we had the
Chairman's signature. When Gore called Murphy personally later
that day to ask that he rescind the letter, the Chairman chuckled
and said he would not. "Those boys from Tennessee beat you fair
and square, Al." So despite Al Gore's attempt to double back, the
request letter was honored and GAO prepared the study we had
hoped would be forthcoming. 50 On its own terms the GAO study
was everything we had hoped. When it appeared in October of
1977 it was extraordinarily straightforward, for the first time pub-
licly declaring the economic shortcomings of virtually every aspect
of TVA's justifications for the dam. 51 The Comptroller-General's
team, reviewing each benefit claimed for the project and the exis-
tence of river-based alternatives concluded that TVA's justifica-
tions for Tellico "do not give a truly valid picture," were
"statistically weak," and "inflated." The GAO report ended with
an unusually decisive "Conclusion and Recommendation to Con-
50. In his book, EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HuMAN SPIRIT (Plume
1993), Mr. Gore unaccountably leaves out any mention of the Tellico Dam case,
though it was the biggest environmental case coming out of his home state of Tennes-
see in that decade, the most important case under the ESA, and one would have
thought it a paradigm example reinforcing his arguments about the importance of
rational overall environmental accounting.
51. See COMPTROLLER-GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:
THE TVA's TELLICO DAM PROJEcT-CosTs, ALTERNATIVES, AND BENEFITS, EMD-77-58
(Oct. 14, 1977) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], the GAO Report requested by Chairman
Jack Murphy and Subcommittee Chair Robert Leggett of the House Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries. The GAO is an agency of Congress itself, not an
executive agency, established to inform Members of Congress on complex accounting
issues and beyond. 2 U.S.C. § 601(b)(4) (2000). This forum can be dramatically useful
to citizens trying to obtain an authoritative confirmation of their analysis of chal-
lenged projects and programs, but the GAO needs to be requested to do a study by
powerful congressional figures. The Tennessee citizens were able to get the request
from two committee chairmen through luck, legerdemain, and a small bribe, which is
another story.
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gress"-"The Congress should prohibit by law the Authority from
spending any more appropriations for work on the project that
would further endanger the darter" or be wasted if the dam was
not completed, pending an intensive economic rethinking of the
project.52
The real lesson of the GAO study for us, however, was not the
conclusions it drew but the fact that they made no difference-
because they made no media splash. The GAO study, though we
carried it to press offices throughout the Capitol and tried to focus
the committees' attention on its dramatic conclusions, was re-
ceived largely with silence. Not even one news story appeared in
the national press noting the report's dramatic verdict-reversing
the standard fish-dam story-that this dam project, despite mil-
lions of dollars and fifteen years of work already invested in its
construction, still could not be economically justified. What we
sadly discovered was that in official Washington, if the newspa-
pers or broadcast media do not pick up on a story, the story does
not exist.
The Supremes. The politics of the case within the Supreme Court
argument is a story for another day, but a political twist before the
day of argument showed us that the person and policies of a Presi-
dent are not irrelevant and of no effect. Jimmy Carter had been
persuaded by his Attorney General, Griffin Bell, that the Depart-
ment of Justice should represent the TVA in the Court. But our
allies in the Domestic Council pushed Interior Secretary Andrus
to prepare a counter brief against the Department of Justice and
TVA. After intensive internal negotiations ("This is just like
Watergate politics," Attorney General Bell fumed 53), a devastat-
ing Department of Interior brief countering each of the TVA's ar-
guments was bound into the back of TVA's own brief as an
Appendix refuting all that preceded it. This meant that the Attor-
52. GAO REPORT, supra note 51, at 29, 32.
53. Quizzed about the split federal voices in his brief, Attorney General Bell said
during the oral argument, "I do not favor this system. We have one Attorney General
and one Solicitor General, and I think that ought to be it." Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment at 30, TVA v. Hill, No. 76-1701 (U.S. April 18, 1978). Bell's response reveals an
unspoken riddle. What exactly is the role of the Attorney General when he decides to
represent an agency's position? Is he taking that position as attorney for the agency,
or as attorney for the entire federal government? Bell seemed to think that, short of
the President, he as Attorney General or his deputy the Solicitor General should be
allowed to decide what the position of the entire Administration on the Endangered
Species Act was to be. That's over-reaching. No wonder Secretary Cecil Andrus re-
acted violently and submitted a counter-brief.
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ney General went into the oral argument carrying a brief in which
the federal government argued for us, as well as against us. It
helped us and the Act, and caused Bell a good deal of consterna-
tion during the oral argument. The pro-ESA split-brief probably
would never have happened in the Ford, Reagan, or Bush Sr. or
Bush Jr. Administrations.
For the citizens, the Supreme Court litigation was a double
forum, both legal and political. The brief and many points in the
argument were calculated not only to raise the legal arguments-
primarily statutory interpretation, separation of powers, and the
proper role of equitable balancing-but also to get across the real
facts to American public opinion to secure our political position.
Maybe from the briefs and arguments the public would finally see
that this was not a hydroelectric project, that it involved massive
condemnation and resale of private property, eliminating farms,
recreation, and historical resources. Unfortunately, although the
first part of the agenda was satisfactorily completed-the Court
upheld the injunction against Tellico Dam, 6-3-the media never
got beyond the silly-little-fish-versus-presumably-important-dam
story. We may have won the argument against the Attorney Gen-
eral in the Court, but he won the news spin in his press conference
on the Court's front steps, where he waved the little fish in the air
and said "this is what it's all about, and it's ridiculous." The me-
dia loved it.
God Squad. After the Court's decision upholding the snail darter
injunction, Howard Baker and the pork barrel started agitating
for a legislative override. Senator John Culver-perhaps because
he liked farmers even though these Tennesseans lived far from his
Iowa constituents, or to defend his subcommittee's turf, or simply
to fight for what he knew was right-though he was just a fresh-
man senator, heroically defended the Act against Baker's at-
tempts to water it down and override the Tellico injunction.
Culver then brokered a compromise ESA amendment with Baker:
They would create a Cabinet-level Endangered Species Commit-
tee, almost immediately dubbed the "God Squad," with the power
to override the Act and exterminate a species if three criteria were
met. The snail darter would be the first case to go into this gaunt-
let.54 We were pleased with the amendment, hoping that it would
54. See ESA Amendments of 1978. The three criteria were set out in the amend-
ment:
§1536 (h).. .The Committee shall grant an exemption ... if, by a vote of
not less than five of its [seven] members voting in person-
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finally produce a highly publicized verdict against the dam, so to
help assure its passage we opposed it. In that political context, if
we had supported Culver's amendment Baker might well have
had second thoughts. If the environmentalists opposed it, how-
ever, it must be good. 55
We approached the day of God Squad judgment with trepida-
tion. We had worked surreptitiously behind the scenes with the
committee staff (was this ethical?) to build a full record of project
dysfunctions. By the terms of the amendment, however, the God
Squad was directed to ignore all the project's sunk costs. If the
fish and its river were to survive in their natural condition, their
merits would have to win on today's balance sheet, outweighing
fifteen years of past expenditures. As the staff analysis of both
sides of the case came to a close, there was silence and then
Charles Schultze, Chairman of the President's Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors, cleared his throat. Would he say it's too late to
turn back now?
Well, somebody has to start .... The interesting phenomenon is
that here is a project that is 95% complete, and if one takes just
the cost of finishing it against the [total] benefits, and does it
(A) it determines on the record [after a full hearing] that-
(i) there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency
action;
(ii) the benefits of such action clearly outweigh the benefits of alter-
native courses of action consistent with conserving the species or
its critical habitat, and such action is in the public interest;
(iii) the action is of regional or national significance...
Later a fourth criterion was added in part in response to TVA's behavior on Tellico:
(iv) neither the federal agency concerned nor the exemption appli-
cant [after having received notice of the risk to the species] made
any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resource ....
The original text of the first three exemption criteria were drafted by a non-attorney
staffer who serendipitously had taken our course in Environmental Law for under-
graduates and graduate students at the University of Michigan.
55. Our position was consciously disingenuous, given our continually eroding
opinion of legislators. But we argued in effect "Don't take these tough decisions away
from where they belong in Congress, the democratically appropriate forum, and put
them into an expert executive review panel. Oh please, Br'er Fox, please don't throw
us in that there briar patch!"' Despite our attempts to explain to Culver that our
stalking horse stance positioned him as a centrist in the compromise, the senator took
offense, blistering our position paper on the God Squad-which said it was "another
unneeded bureaucratic committee, if Congress would take its hearings seriously." A
journalist who was shadowing Culver during this time reported his fury that "the
press releases went out saying [his God Squad compromise] was a know-nothing at-
tack on the ecosystem." ELIZABETH DREW, SENATOR, 33 (New York, Simon &
Schuster) (1978).
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properly, it doesn't pay! Which says something about the origi-
nal design!" [applause] 56
The God Squad voted unanimously to deny the exemption and up-
hold the Tellico Dam injunction based on economic grounds. Al-
most as unanimously, however, the newspapers and broadcast
media, which had bannered the fish-dam clich6 as the lead story
when the Court issued its decision based on the fish, ignored the
dramatic revisionary verdict showing that the ESA and the darter
lawsuit made solid economic sense. Their silence proved fatal.
A forty-two second appropriations rider. To our sorrow, we soon
learned about "riders." From January to mid-June, nothing hap-
pened. The Carter Administration was off balance trying to cope
with Panama Canal turmoil, attempts to repeal the Department
of Education, pork barrel assaults on the President's water policy,
and smoldering opposition to his outsider politics. David Free-
man, Carter's TVA appointee was incapable, for reasons of per-
sonal style it seemed, of working with us to get farmers back on
the land or to publicize the project's defects and the attractive al-
ternative developments available for the river valley, all of which
would have dramatically changed his and our political context.
And then we learned about riders. Late in the afternoon of
June 18, in the almost-empty House chamber, the appropriations
committee slipped a brief amendment onto the water and energy
funding bill without allowing it to be read out loud.57 Although it
56. See supra note 12.
57. 125 CONG. REC. H-15301 (June 18, 1979). The House was officially in session,
but very few members were in attendance, with the exception of the Appropriations
Committee members who all were sitting together as a series of appropriations bills
for power and water development were being brought to the floor. A representative
from New York made a short speech about avoiding nuclear hazards. The docket then
shifted to the TVA appropriations. Rep. John Duncan of Tennessee took the lectern.
"Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment." The clerk began to read "on page 28, line 18,
strike the period and insert'; provided, not withstanding the provisions of.... At
this point, Duncan broke in, "Mr. Chairman! Mr. Chairman! Mr. Chairman!," to
waive the reading of the amendment's text. The Speaker pro tem turned to the com-
mittee members sitting on the floor, and asked "is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Tennessee?" Rep. Myers of Indiana stood, and said "the minority has
reviewed the amendment and accepts it." Chairman Bevill stood and added that the
Democrats had "no objections to the amendment." The Chairman called the question
on the amendment that had not been read. The committee members called out "aye."
No one else in the chamber knew what was going on. There were no nays. "The ayes
have it." In forty-two seconds, six years of our citizen litigation had effectively been
reversed. The full text of the amendment overrode all laws that might block construc-
tion of the Tellico Reservoir, not just the Endangered Species Act, and ordered that
the reservoir be completed forthwith. The actual truncated reading of the amend-
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was not discovered until the Congressional Record came out the
following morning, in those forty-two seconds that rider effectively
reversed six years of our labors in the agencies, courts, congres-
sional hearings, and the unique forum of the God Squad. (Ten
seconds later the committee similarly overrode a central provision
of Carter's water policy, nullifying the Water Resources Council's
authority to review the economics of all subsidized federal public
works projects. 58 )
We tried desperately to get the snail darter rider stricken
from the Christmas tree appropriations bill, but the pork barrel's
political superiority to the Administration was becoming sadly ev-
ident. In a sharp letter sent to all 535 members of the House and
Senate, Secretary Andrus reminded them that they had appointed
him Chair of the special seven-member Committee to scrutinize
the Tellico Dam, and the Committee had unanimously found "on
the basis of economic considerations alone, the project is not justi-
fied."59 On this record, Andrus said, "I intend to urge the Presi-
dent to veto the.., bill if the language on Tellico remains.. ." and
"I strongly urge [you] ... to strike the Tellico language from the
bill."60
But Congress, though it has nearly peremptory power in func-
tional terms of day-to-day dominance of the political life of the fed-
eral government, does not operate on factual merits but on
political merits. Its insider players, internal deals and alliances,
and selective perspectives of self-interest dominate its day-to-day
actions. As our motion to strike the rider came to a vote in both
chambers (an accomplishment in itself), appropriations committee
members worked the floor with Howard Baker and House Major-
ment and the voice votes can be heard on the Library of Congress tape of that date,
and on a video clip in the possession of the author.
58. Pub. L. No. 96-69, 93 Stat 497 (1979).
None of the funds appropriated under this paragraph may be expended
by the Water Resources Counsel for the review of ... any pre-authorized
report or proposal, or any pre-construction plan.., for a federal or feder-
ally assisted program or a related land resources project or program un-
less funds for these purposes are [specifically] authorized to be
appropriated by Congress in a statute enacted after the date of enactment
of this Act.
In other words, unless the pork barrel committees gave special funding to scrutinize
their projects, which would not occur prior to Hell freezing over, the Water Resources
Council was forbidden to scrutinize them.
59. Letters from Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus to Members of the House
and Members of the Senate, July 16, 1979 and July 27, 1979 (copy on file with Pace
Environmental Law Review).
60. Id.
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ity Leader Jim Wright, saying a "No" vote was obligatory to save
the Congress's traditional logrolling public works system. The
factual public merits of the case were not the issue, but rather the
political merits of the pork barrel. The darter and the river lost by
100 votes in the House and narrowly in the Senate.6 1
Note the political reality: Virtually every member of Congress
knew from Andrus's authoritative letter that the dam's claimed
merits were objectively false and the environmentalists' case was
economically and rationally sound. The appropriations commit-
tees, like TVA, presumably had known this from the start. But
the majority of members tilted against the darter and the Act for
their own internal institutional reasons, and the only question
was whether anything could force a majority nevertheless to vote
on the actual facts. What might have induced them to follow the
civic merits of the issue?-a realistic threat that an informed pub-
lic would perceive what they were doing.
Deeply distressed, we realized that the issue was not what the
congressional majority knew about Tellico and the ESA. It was
that the congressional majority knew that America did not know
the merits of the case, and probably never would, so they could
vote the accustomed insider game with impunity.
Ending with a whimper. So now it was a veto game. The darter's
defenders and our NGO allies throughout the Washington conser-
vation community, along with Secretary Andrus, began a cam-
paign to obtain and uphold a veto of the bill. Carter was to make
his decision on the afternoon of September 25, then board Air
Force One to fly to meetings with civic and community leaders in
New York City. With an hour to go before his departure, Carter
had decided to veto the bill, and drafted a veto message for its
release. The Domestic Council notified us to be ready for a call
and to start preparing publicity on the veto. With the help of Dick
Ottinger and other stalwarts in the House, we had lined up 163
votes to sustain the veto, solidly more than the 145 required.
With a veto, maybe at last America could be brought to see the
facts. We waited anxiously. Two hours later we got a call patched
through from the presidential plane. "Deacon is calling." "Hello,
Professor Plater? I understand you have been working on this
matter and wanted you to know I have decided it is best to ap-
61. House Roll Call No. 427, 125 CONG. REc. H21,987-22,011 (Aug. 1, 1979) (TVA
wins 214-184 [36 abstentions]); Al Gore voted against the darter, Newt Gingrich for;
Senate Roll Call Vote No. 269, 125 CONG. REC. S23,863-272 (Sept. 10, 1979) (TVA wins
48-44 [8 abstentions]).
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prove the appropriations bill as it stands." To my angry remon-
strances that ensued he repeatedly said that signing the bill was a
concession he felt forced to make "because the Appropriations
Subcommittee Chairman is insisting on this rider .... I think I
am doing the best I can for the environment on this .... This is
not an issue on which we can prevail."6 2
The Press, again. Later that fall (while pursuing yet another un-
successful attempt to save the darter and the river by bringing a
constitutional lawsuit to overturn the statute on First Amend-
ment Native American freedom of religion grounds 63), we learned
what had apparently happened in Carter's head that day. Friends
in the White House reported to us that just before the President
boarded the helicopter to fly to Andrews Air Force Base for the
trip to New York, Frank Moore, Carter's fellow Georgian and chief
of liaison with Congress, had come into the Oval Office. "I hear
you are planning to veto that bill with the TVA rider in it?" "Yes,"
Carter reportedly said. "The bill undercuts our environmental
program and all the work Andrus's Committee put into this
thing." "Mr. President, you cannot veto this bill. If you do, you
are going to wake up tomorrow and in the papers all you'll see is
editorial cartoons of you holding a Snail Darter in one hand and a
Killer Rabbit in the other. You can't afford that kind of press."6 4
Carter yielded, judging that even The President of the United
States in a pointed veto message could not get this endangered
species success story through to the American people.
The significant audience, it finally was clear to us, was not
the President and not the Congress. President Carter, a particu-
larly weak executive, nevertheless reflected the general vulnera-
bility and dependence of the modern chief executive toward the
power and volatility of Congress. And the actions of Congress
62. Personal Notes of author, 9:30 p.m. (Sept. 25, 1979) (on file with author). Why
did Carter bother calling? Apologies, with a deep desire for forgiveness, we were told,
were part of the way he operated.
63. See Sequoyah v. TVA, 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), affd, 620 F.2d 1159
(6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
64. The killer rabbit reference is to a story that had come out in the press mocking
Carter for being attacked by a swimming rabbit while fishing in the South one day on
a vacation from Washington. See, e.g., Kenneth Bredemeier, Carter Told to Yell
"Shoo" at Rabbits, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1979, at A5; Henry Mitchell, Any Day: Animal
Animus and The Ripper Rabbit, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1979, at C1. Editorial cartoons
were regularly mocking Carter's diminishing political strength and his inability to
command media respect.
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showed us that for public interest advocates the most practical
constraint on Congress was the coverage and climate of the press.
But in the Tellico Dam case, the political process was able to
ignore the public merits of the controversy-ultimately finessing
the snail darter through a business-as-usual maneuver of the pork
barrel's inside game-because even though the case was getting
lots of stories, those stories pictured it as a frivolous excess of
hyper-technical environmentalism. Thus, the insider pork barrel
was able to fly beneath the radar of the public's awareness. The
public never heard even a hint that the snail darter injunction
might make economic sense. When America heard that the dam
would be completed, it was greeted as a rational outcome, long-
expected, too-long delayed, finally applying common sense to envi-
ronmental extremism. (And to the end, the people of East Tennes-
see never heard that they could have had far more and better
development in the valley, keeping the river and the farms as
well. Today, TVA's Tellico reservoir is matter-of-factly taken for
granted as the only alternative that was available. What is, is.)
The denouement of the snail darter saga obviously was dis-
mally frustrating to those who, after such a long painful odyssey,
had brought the dramatic facts to the highest official forums of
government only to be crushed. For many, especially the farmers
who had fought so long and now must watch wealthy resort subdi-
visions developing on their lands and motorboats cruising back
and forth past their old barn silos sticking forlornly up from the
shallow reservoir in the middle of the project area, the bitterness
does not blunt much with time. But it is important to understand
that in no other nation in the world could a little band of citizens
so lacking in money, political power, and tenure, have been able to
raise their issue to the highest levels of government. 65 And we
learned a lot.
Why hadn't environmental law prepared us for politics? In the
course of our six years in Washington my students and I learned a
lot we had not known, but it was bemusing to realize how naive
we were when we arrived. I had studied environmental law with
the best, and yet our coping with the practical politics of everyday
65. On the other hand it could more lugubriously be noted that in no modern
industrial democracy besides the USA, probably, could a contested case once brought
to such a high level of official process, with such a decisive public record of the pro-
posed project's dysfunctional diseconomies, nevertheless ultimately be overridden so
cavalierly by legislative sleight of hand in a callow uncomprehending media climate
mired in infotainment.
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practice in government, and our sense of where it all fit, was based
on shot-in-the-dark guesswork, sage advice on the spot from a dis-
parate range of volunteer mentors, and a pastiche of 1960s im-
pressions drawn from people ranging from Nixon and Nader to
Abbey and Dylan.
One cannot expect environmental law training to produce ad-
vocates ready to cope with the full sophistication of Capitol Hill
politics in state and national government. But we could prepare
our students to recognize the underlying structures and phenom-
ena. They could understand the existence of political realities
that we needed to know-the shadowy dons of the appropriations
process and the pork barrel, the mass of extraneous suasions and
deterrents to agency action, the importance of having spooks on
the inside, lobbyists, the political leverage of subcommittee chairs,
the GAO, the fact that civic merits do not necessarily determine
governmental outcomes, the extraordinarily decisive potential
power of the media to shape public opinion and the impression of
what public opinion will be, iron triangles, outsiders and insiders,
the functional omnipresence of the marketplace Establishment-
all these and dozens more were revelations we had to discover and
learn to handle by luck, happenstance, or bitter experience.
Why do we teachers so often avoid directly addressing these
realities despite the fact that we understand their functional im-
portance? In part it may be that we think it important to separate
law from politics for the sake of our aspirations for a society ruled
by principles rather than human whim. As Bruce Ackerman
anguished in another setting, "my entire academic career ... has
been one long struggle against the view that law is just politics."
To acknowledge the politics in law risks a "renaissance of legal
nihilism in our nation's law schools, which will slowly erode gen-
eral confidence in the system."66 We fear that by talking about
the hulking reality of politics we will obscure the fragile vine of
the evolving pretensions of the rule of law in our field. So we pre-
tend that the Emperor is wearing clothes. We shy away from
teaching the hurly-burly of practical politics, perhaps, because we
regard it as difficult to do and not at all a high calling. In many
law school settings, moreover, we seem reluctant even to teach
policy and theories of government, perhaps flinching from predict-
able accusations of political correctness. Universities are the
66. See Bruce Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself, 12 AM. PROSPECT 3 (Feb 12,
2001), available at http://www.prospect.org/print/V12/3/ackerman-b.html (a despair-
ing plaint after analyzing Bush v. Gore).
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place where such explorations must be undertaken, for where else
will they be done?, but we mostly leave them to the political sci-
ence departments. We want to avoid the criticism that the legal
academy represents a skewed partisan alignment. Like the
League of Conservation Voters (LCV) we confront a field which in
elective reality has quite a clear partisan division. The LCV nur-
tures and cherishes its opportunities to support environmentally
progressive Republicans because the LCV's annual legislative
scorecards show so few members of the GOP at the environmen-
tal-protection end of the spectrum. Where the congressional GOP
typically has scores averaging less than 20%, and its leadership
close to 0%, the Democrat's average is above 80%, with its leaders
at 83%.67
And then there is the Cassandra syndrome. We are like the
sad daughter of Troy's King Priam who was cursed with seeing
the truth, but none would believe her when she foresaw danger for
her polis lying within the belly of the huge horse on wheels. Many
of us in environmental law, a field that so vividly illuminates
large systemic issues, do not relish the foreseeable prospect of be-
ing regarded as chronic dismalists if we repeatedly point to the
systemic shortcomings of our society's central institutions. Better
just to focus on structures and doctrine.
But there is a real need for us to try. From a more articulated
integration of political considerations, macro and micro, would
come not cynicism but a broader and more realistic recognition of
the structures and challenges with which we and our students
must live and work-including the chess game of daily govern-
mental life, human nature in all its rich complexity, environmen-
tal citizenship and the role of an informed and engaged citizenry,
the Press's critical role as public information system and forum for
policy debates, the systemic importance of campaign finance re-
form, opportunities for encouraging the corporate responsibility
67. In the 2001 League of Conservation Voters' Scorecard, for example, Demo-
crats in the Senate averaged 82% and Republicans 9%; Democrats in the House aver-
aged 81% and Republicans 16%. The senior Democratic leadership averaged 84% in
the Senate and 83% in the House; the senior GOP leaders averaged 0% in the Senate
and 0% in the House. The highest GOP legislator was Rep. Connie Morella of Mary-
land with a 93%. There were 72 Democrats with scores of 100%. There were 128
Republicans, no Democrats, with scores of 0%. LEAGUE OF CONSERVATION VOTERS,
2001 NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SCORECARD 6, 8-10 (2002) (copy on file with Pace En-
vironmental Law Review). This fascinating annotated statistical abstract is available
annually at www.lcv.org.
[Vol. 19
48http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol19/iss2/1
2002] ENVTL LAW IN THE POLITICAL ECOSYSTEM 471
movement, the virtues of transparency (a term many of our stu-
dents have never even heard), and so on.
How to integrate a practical perspective on politics into the
teaching of environmental law? That's a conference topic in itself.
There are promising ways to open up the way we teach the field.
Beyond the judicious use of instructive legal war stories, many of
us have been discovering the creative utility of using complex sim-
ulations of environmental regulatory problems as a practical way
to open our students' eyes to the intertwined realities of environ-
mental law and politics. Negotiation role-playing, field trips to
real life controversies, case study practicums. The talking-head
model of law teaching is long past due for an overhaul, and on that
path the realities of environmental law practice will tend to give
the recognition of daily politics a legitimate place in the next gen-
eration of environmental law teaching. For starters, it would be
good to get the phenomenon out on the table.68
III. Stepping Back: An Overview of Societal Governance
The Four, Five, or Six Branches of National Government
In the course of the six years of our fish-dam campaign, just
as we learned that the practical workings of government were per-
meated with political processes to a degree we had not previously
appreciated, we also came to view the overall structure of govern-
ment in a very different light.69
68. I diffidently note that ours is the only environmental law casebook that
straightforwardly addresses the central relevance of understanding the "contending
forces" in the political sphere around an issue, and directly states its bias (for trans-
parency and citizen participation) from the beginning. See PLATER ET AL, NATURE,
LAw & SocIETY, supra note 29, at xxxvii, 29-32, 88-89.
69. Our multi-branch analysis and the need for more sophisticated civics aware-
ness both are echoed in a recent Boston Globe op-ed piece:
In the old days... students learned how a bill became a law (a descrip-
tion that bore almost no resemblance to the way it really happens).., and
the three branches of governing (leaving out two other important Wash-
ington power centers, the interest group and the media). No matter. Civ-
ics is on its way back... In truth, civics education may be an idea whose
time has come (again), and it may be a topic that, after the Sept. 11 ter-
rorist attacks, is welcomed by liberals and conservatives, regardless of
their views on the role of government in American life . . . "The demo-
cratic process requires knowledgeable citizens who can read and write,
but also be active," says [State Senator Richard T. Moore], who also
serves as president of the Massachusetts chapter of the American Society
for Public Administration. "Without them, it doesn't work. Without
them, only a select few play a role in government. Without them, the
squeaky wheels will have power, but the ordinary citizens won't." ... It
used to be implied that everyone had large citizenship responsibilities
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The judiciary, the presidency. Which branch of government, for
instance, is dominant? Arriving in Washington we knew it was
not the courts. The judicial branch was crucial to our effort but
clearly had only an adjunct role in finalizing this and most public
policy issues, especially those lacking a clear constitutional ques-
tion. We initially assumed that the President was the power
center, and when we gained contacts within the Carter White
House staff we thought that a decisive corner had been turned.
Long before the whimpering denouement of the apologetic phone
call from Air Force One, however, we had discovered that a Presi-
dent has only such political power as he can pull together issue by
issue. Momentum helps, and neither the Ford nor the Carter
presidency ever had much of that, but in any presidency it seemed
to us there is little a President can count on accomplishing by bare
fiat.
..... . .
- .LEGISLATIVE BRANCH EXECUTIVE BRANCH JUDICIAL BRANCH .
LEGISLATURE CHIEF EXECUTIVE . JUDICIARY
EXECUTIVE AGENC
.... ' .::' .,* : .... .. ................   ... ., ., 1 ' .: ,
S ADMINISTRATIVE RANCH
C M' EQA R A C INDEPENDENT AGENCIES C NM NL~
THE "MARKETPLACE" BRANCH
CHART ONE: THE 5 OR 6 FUNCTIONAL BRANCHES
OF GOVERNMENT70
and should be participating," [says Richard Niemi, A University of Roch-
ester political scientist]. "Maybe we've gone overboard by trying not to
preach. We're at a different extreme now. We have to get back to
balance."
David M. Shribman, Bush's Civics Proposal May Provide Students with First Case
Study, BOSTON GLOBE, May 14, 2002, at A3.
70. As noted in the impressionistic analysis presented in the text of this essay, the
"executive" branch practically can be divided into "Schedule C" agency officials who
are political appointees serving at the pleasure of the chief executive, and the vast
majority who are Civil Service employees serving despite Administration changes, the
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The executive branch, the administrative branch. As Chart One
implies, in functional terms the President is not even in charge of
all that is typically referred to as "the executive branch." Just
consider the name of the office-merely the "preside-ent." The
President does control his personal staff and the men and women
who serve at his pleasure at the very top ranks of Cabinet and
other dependent agencies, and he retains substantial budget
power, although far less than formerly. The vast majority of the
federal government, however, should more properly be referred to
as "the administrative branch." Independent agencies like TVA
and many others are only casually under his authority, their lead-
ers appointed for fixed terms, thereafter dismissible only for
proven incompetence or moral turpitude, and their budgets are
now determined by Congress as much as the White House. 71 But
even within the Cabinet agencies themselves we realized that the
vast bulk of agency staffers, as Civil Service employees, were like-
wise scarcely dismissible, and that the agencies had ponderous in-
ternal cultures that plowed along irrespective of changes in
administration. The degree to which a President's political ap-
pointees in Cabinet agency leadership positions made a difference
seemed to correspond to how well they as individuals fit each
agency's internal culture as it existed in the administrative
branch. Due to iron triangles and in some cases outright capture,
agencies like the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
or particular divisions like the Forest Service in the Department
"administrative" branch. As argued in the text, two further powerful "branches" are
the Fourth Estate, the Media, and the political-economic Marketplace, which may be
the most dominant branch of all. Chart assistance credit: Joan Shear.
71. In 1974, responding to many Members' displeasure with Richard Nixon's at-
tempts to impound appropriations for several programs he did not favor, especially
highway and environmental programs, and the fact that Presidents effectively mo-
nopolized most of the budget-formulating process, Congress enacted the Congres-
sional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. 88 Stat. 320 (effective July 12,
1974) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 680 (1997). The Act grew out of a 1967 report by Lyndon
Baines Johnson's Presidential Commission on Budget Concepts that appeared only
shortly before LBJ left office so Johnson never had to face the shift of power down
Pennsylvania Avenue that the reforms accomplished. The 1974 Act established pro-
cedures for Congress to develop its own draft annual congressional budget. It created
the expert Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and standing committees in both
chambers devoted solely to the Budget. These committees and the CBO then estab-
lished strategic technological parity with the President by purchasing their own com-
puter, a prosaic act that some would say had constitutional consequences. See
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, 2 U.S.C. § 680 (1997), as
amended. For background see also BENJAMIN GINSBERG & MARTIN SHEFTER, POLITICS
By OTHER MEANS: POLITICIANS, PROSECUTORS, AND THE PRESS FROM WATERGATE TO
WHITEWATER (W.W. Norton ed., 1999).
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of Agriculture, both of which were unenthusiastic about the ESA,
might well be more aligned with the industries with which they
worked than with the President, especially a reform-minded Pres-
ident who wished to change the agency's fundamental course.
The congressional branch. So, adding the legislature, that makes
four branches of government, and of these four Congress clearly
seems to be pre-eminent. The political chips a President has to
pull together to build a prevailing position on an issue are prima-
rily tied to Congress. If Congress cuts appropriations, refuses to
vote a desired bill out of committee, threatens awkward hearings,
or makes any of many other moves in its arsenal, executive initia-
tives can be stalled in their tracks. Since the departure of LBJ
and the arrival of the congressional Budget Committees with their
own budget-drafting computers, 72 the White House's presumption
of pre-eminence has disappeared. If the calculus of Washington is
built on power, and power is based on how much a player can hurt
or help you, then it appeared to us that Congress, especially in its
senior members, is courted and feared the most.
The Media branch of government. But we discovered that Con-
gress itself courted and feared yet another structure of the politi-
cal process that apparently could wield sharper peremptory power
even than they. It's the Press. Although we were never privileged
to receive the kind of incisive journalistic coverage that could have
changed our fortunes in the legislative process, we were repeat-
edly amazed by how reporters on other issues were treated as
fearsome potentates, and how a series of dramatic and revealing
press stories could quickly change the tone and outcome of a pub-
lic policy debate.
The Press is so important and so potent a part of the govern-
ance process that it too deserves recognition as a branch of govern-
ment, and that makes five. On Chart One the Media Branch is
denoted by the fog-like presence drifting around the other
branches, omnipresent, thought to be daily shaping and embody-
ing the public opinion of the nation, providing a major part of the
informational grist upon which the other branches (perhaps even
the courts) base their actions, erratic, but always ready to con-
dense in sudden stormclouds of focused coverage.
The Marketplace branch of government. But, we ultimately de-
cided, there is another branch of national government more omni-
72. See generally note 71 on Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act
of 1974.
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present and powerful than these five. It's what we came to think
of as the political-economic "Marketplace." The marketplace has
arguably always been the most powerful "government" of Ameri-
can life. It can be argued that the marketplace economy was in
fact the true driving force of the Revolution that cut us off from
colonial rule and set us off on our manifest destiny march of con-
quest across the continent. The Thirteen Colonies had matured as
a separate market entity and so "like ripe fruit" they dropped
away from Great Britain. Still today the marketplace is far more
powerful than any other in governing the daily life of the nation,
intimately shaping the lives of each of us, supplying or withhold-
ing an array of goods, services, and behavioral options. The press,
which we saw wielding such power over the players of govern-
ment, is still, when you get down to it, part of the marketplace in
the business of selling news and infotainment.
Wherever we went in Washington we found the organs of gov-
ernment responding with instinctive attention to the marketplace
interests and coalitions involved in each issue. Interior under-
standably flinched when it realized that the ESA would throw it
into confrontation with the marketplace coalition of economic and
political forces that was the Tenn-Tom pork barrel. Interior, like
other departments, instinctively responded in all its various sub-
departments to the array of industry networks it connected with-
mining, grazing, water supply, oil and gas, transportation, power,
irrigation, timber, pulp and paper, fishing, homebuilding, urban
construction, and many more, many of which were in the parade
of witnesses from industry and commerce who appeared in con-
gressional hearings and corridors lobbying on the ESA.
In the iron triangles we observed throughout government,
from Southeastern water projects to national forest timber cutting
in the Pacific Northwest, it appeared to us that the marketplace
element of the triad was dominant. The agency was the vehicle
for federal participation in construction or subsidies, and the con-
gressional sponsors were critically important in obtaining project
and program authorizations and appropriations. But the engine
that drove both was the linkage to the marketplace players
outside government that generate payrolls, campaign contribu-
tions, local and national economic activity, vote-enhancing public
relations. The marketplace economy seemed to us a powerful la-
tent presence, the mass and momentum of which undergirded and
affected most of the daily business of the official entities of govern-
ment. The federal government may be a tiger (and we often felt
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like a mere flea on that tiger), but we decided the tiger was riding,
with its claws mostly sheathed, atop a lumbering elephant.
By thinking of government through the expanded rubric of six
branches we could make more sense of the processes and players
that we encountered over our six years in Washington. In our
case we had to operate in all six branches, but in doing so it was
important to have an orienting sense of the interactions, of what
each could and could not do, of where power lay and how to ad-
dress it.
Beyond the Multiple Branches of Government: A Societal Construct
of Three Economies
The assertion that social governance proceeds in six different
"branches," however, does not provide a conceptual construct of
the political whole sufficient to explain the place of environmental
law. To make that further step, I invite consideration of a model
used with my students for several years, built upon the idea of an
"economy of nature" floated by Joe Sax in 1993. 73 For better or
worse it seems appropriate to seek a holistic societal construct
within the rubric of "economics" rather than "law," and the hy-
pothesis I am asserting is that we live in not just one economy, but
simultaneously in three.
The marketplace economy. The construct begins with the huge
compound mechanism that most people primarily are thinking of
when they speak of "the economy." Let's call it the "marketplace
economy," and by that phrase I do not mean just the world of busi-
ness, but the vast behavioral system beloved of the Chicago School
comprised of millions of individualized daily decisions of corporate
and individual actors, private and public entities. The market-
place economy is the dominant structure of human and govern-
mental actions, an immensely powerful network of networks, a
system of interconnecting systems. It makes sense, in Chart Two,
to picture the marketplace as the central figure, dominating the
daily life of the three economies' societal cosmology. The intercon-
necting rings within it represent the dynamic energy of its net-
73. See Joseph Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1445 (1993); see also
Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law and the Three Economies: Navigating a
Sprawling Field of Study, Practice, and Societal Governance in which Everything is
Connected to Everything Else, 23 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 359 (1999); Zygmunt J.B.
Plater, The Three Economies: An Essay in Honor of Joseph Sax, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 411
(1998).
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works of interconnecting systems, and not coincidentally echo the
international logo for a nuclear fission reaction.
CHART TWO: THE THREE ECONOMIES 74
The marketplace economy is the most powerful, intimate,
highly articulated, self-energizing human system ever invented,
probably including religion. Public agencies as well as corpora-
tions are major integral components of the market economy, as
TVA and many other federal actors demonstrate. It is naive to
74. Another impressionistic illustration. As noted in the text of the essay, it re-
quires three intersecting economies to accomplish a fully realistic economic analysis
of most issues of environmental law. The Marketplace Economy is the dominating
dynamo of the society, at least in the short term, dealing with everything that can be
reduced to market pricing and its equivalents, and traded. The Marketplace takes in
resources and other inputs from the Economy of Nature and the Civic-Societal Econ-
omy, and directly or indirectly passes its excesses and negative externalizations back
into the other two economies. Government and law are interposed as a protective
buffer around the Marketplace, with varying degrees of effectiveness, to protect peo-
ple, culture, Nature, and other diffuse values from "market failure" situations where
the Marketplace Economy undercuts or insufficiently serves societal welfare.
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think of any major sector of the marketplace economy, for instance
energy, without thoroughly incorporating the internal dynamics of
iron triangles and agencies like Department of Energy, the Bonne-
ville Power Authority, TVA, FERC, Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion, state utility board politics, and so on.
The marketplace economy's elaborate synapses for brokering
motivations and payoffs have built breathtaking wealth and tech-
nological power for modern society. But for all its dynamism, the
marketplace economy has several tragic flaws. Every entity in the
marketplace economy basically tends to deal only with things that
have some form of price tag attached, where benefits or costs are
registered and accountable, and each entity also shares the same
tragic logic of cost externalization so well known by environmental
lawyers, so that wherever possible each entity tends to externalize
social costs out from the domain of the marketplace economy and
into no-man's land. When combined in huge multiple networks,
the effect of this inclination is to externalize vast amounts of pol-
lution and other disruptive costs into the natural economy and be-
yond. Absent a regulatory environmental accounting, pollution
goes into the air and the nearest water bodies. Rivers, valleys,
forests and farms are officially regarded as cheap and handy
materials for supporting make-work pork barrel projects that al-
low iron triangles to remain potent.
The economy of nature. If you are going to conceptualize "econom-
ics" as a major part of a society's self-governance, it makes sense
to posit and picture-in addition to the dynamic, interconnected
mechanisms of the marketplace economy-an "economy of nature"
as well, a separate economy representing the physical context
upon which the marketplace is built, where resources come from
and where many of the market's externalized costs go.
An economy of nature really does exist. Like the marketplace
economy, it is a complex system of systems, even more intricately
connected and complex than the marketplace economy in the way
it processes the elements and forces within and imposed upon it,
brokering and buffering inputs and disruptions through its cycles
of water, carbon, energy, and interconnecting ecosystem functions.
The marketplace economy takes resources and services from the
economy of nature, and sends back to it pollution, resource dero-
gation, and disrupted ecosystem dynamics. The economy of na-
ture gives and takes, and is forced to adjust as best it can.
But natural resources and services have hugely significant
value even if they are unacknowledged or undervalued by the
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marketplace. Robert Costanza and his colleagues have analyzed
the multi-trillion dollar values of "natural capital," the resources
and services provided free or far below their true value, without
which the marketplace and human life would be impossible. 75
And the costs that are externalized from the marketplace
economy do in fact go somewhere. The ultimate reality is that
everything has consequences. Many externalized negatives are
passed back into the economy of nature with critically significant
consequences to natural systems-pesticides shutting down bacte-
rial soil-building, ecological disruptions from human-caused cli-
mate change, loss of forests, wetlands, prairie. The costs impacted
into the economy of nature do not just disappear out of sight out of
mind. Nature is not a sink. A river that isn't there anymore isn't
there anymore.
The civic-societal economy. But a construct of just two econo-
mies-with the economy of nature added to the familiar market-
place economy-does not adequately capture the full range of
societal dynamics, values, and externalized costs that launched
environmental law in the first place. Environmental law did not
begin exclusively nor primarily as a defense of nature. The
images that launched the environmental law revolution in the
1960s were of pollution directly impinging upon human health.
Where, in the construct of two economies, do the utilitarian
human consequences of the marketplace economy get repre-
sented? Asserting the existence of an economy of nature is not
sufficiently persuasive to prod politicians and others deeply en-
trenched in the blandishments of the marketplace economy to
broaden their perspectives. Our political players are likely to re-
gard this "economy of nature" as an intangible, insubstantial aca-
demic figure of speech that does not impinge on the daily economic
75. Robert Costanza and Herman Daly have led the Natural Capital analysis, and
come up with impressive numbers:
We have estimated the current economic value of 17 ecosystem services
for 16 biomes, based on published studies and a few original calculations.
For the entire biosphere, the value (most of which is outside the market)
is estimated to be in the range of US$16-54 trillion per year .... Because
of the nature of the uncertainties, this must be considered a minimum
estimate. Global gross national product total is around $18 trillion per
year.
Costanza et al., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 387
NATURE 253 (May 15, 1997); see also PAUL HAWKEN ET AL., NATURAL CAPITALISM: THE
COMING EFFICIENcY REVOLUTION (1998); Robert Costanza & Herman Daly, Natural
Capital and Sustainable Development, 6 CONS. Bio. 37-46 (1992); Paul Hawken, Nat-
ural Capitalism, MOTHER JONES, Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 40.
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and political realities in which they live. If you talk about the
"natural economy" you sound like a tree-hugger.
So we need to picture a third concurrent economy, incorporat-
ing elements outside the marketplace economy, like the economy
of nature, but representing a universe of more direct human utili-
tarian self-interests. I would unpoetically call this the "civic-socie-
tal economy." Externalized costs that are passed out of the
marketplace into nature often simultaneously or subsequently
pass on directly or indirectly into the interconnected networks of a
human societal economy as well. This occurs with industrial pol-
lution, some of which goes directly into humans' bodies. Workers,
for instance, have absorbed dangerous levels of solvents into their
blood and endocrine systems while working in unregulated facto-
ries, 76 and a host of other largely unaccounted human social costs
also occur when such solvents are dumped in a river killing or al-
tering a hundred kinds of plant and animal life forms, cutting
back on fishing harvests and recreation, lowering property values,
changing human qualities of life in terms of aesthetics, health,
and collateral economics. The civic-societal economy represents
human values and quality of life that the marketplace does not
adequately value-a stable, secure low income mixed neighbor-
hood, a sunset, a fishable swimmable watercourse, the cultural
richness of communities and places. In the Tellico Dam case, go-
ing beyond the economy of nature, shouldn't one be able to con-
sider the civic human value of a family farm community that had
been settled here for 200 years? And the societal value of the re-
gion's last stretch of big, clean flowing river, the nation's oldest
continuously-inhabited locale with 10,000 years of prehistory, the
ancient heart of the Cherokee nation, a blue ribbon trout river
turned to dross, the moral reverberations of consciously con-
signing a rich, unique ecosystem to extinction?
When you chart the dynamics of all three economies you find
them deeply interconnected, with all three necessary to a realistic
description of how our society functions in its natural context. Na-
ture is not "outside" our human economy or our jurisprudence. 77
76. The Allied Kepone case is the classic example that helped launch the federal
water pollution control act amendments. See PLATER ET AL., NATURE, LAW & SOCIETY,
supra note 29 at, 39-54.
77. Professor David Westbrook has expressed some frustration at the difficulty of
defining a coherent philosophy of environmental jurisprudence. He tried to build a
liberal conceptual overview upon the perspectives of individual human rights, collec-
tive aggregated rights, and markets, but was unable to fit some sectors of environ-
mental law into those realms. Norms protecting endangered species, for instance,
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Human social dynamics and civic values are not reducible to
marketized balance sheets. Thus if you are an economist purport-
ing to tell the nation how it should make production and govern-
ance decisions, you are naive or a crook if you do not consider costs
and benefits within all three economies. You cannot rationally
decide how to produce and apply a chemical, propose to clear-cut
federal subalpine forests, mine a mountain, pass a fast-track
agreement exalting global trade, or build a dam, without weighing
the consequences in all three economies.
Where is government in the three economies? Theoretically, of
course, our legal system periodically recognizes the importance of
the second and third economies. Statutes and regulatory systems
are primarily created to correct private and public failures in the
marketplace economy-addressing the marketplace's dysfunc-
tional impacts upon the other two spheres. Schematically, then,
we can best conceive of government as strategically positioned
around the perimeter of the marketplace economy, looking in. Al-
though much of government is created to facilitate the functioning
of the marketplace, the core objective of most regulatory entities,
programs, and societally protective statutes, including most in the
environmental field, is to attempt to mitigate and control the ex-
cesses of the marketplace. Thou shalt not throw carcinogenic
chemicals into the natural environment, nor destroy forests or
wetlands unless you can substantially recreate them, nor expose
vulnerable populations to substances that pose metabolic hazards,
seemed to come from an alien, less human-centered domain. See generally David A.
Westbrook, Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence, 27 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 619 (1994).
As he has commented:
Most of our law may be (must be) articulable in some liberal language.
But the Endangered Species Act cannot be, not really .... At some point
liberalism's concern for the internal (autonomy, choice), fails to capture
environmentalism's sense of the external (ecosystems, nature, etc.). At
the end of the day, you cannot explain the outside in terms of the inside."
Posting of e-mail message from dwestbro@acsu.buffalo.edu to envlaw-
profs@darkwing.uoregon.edu (Nov. 6, 2001) (Copy on file with Pace Envi-
ronmental Law Review.).
Conceptualizing the existence of three interlinked economies, however, helps to clar-
ify that environmental jurisprudence operates on the realistic foundation that there is
no external outside. Environmental law's high purpose and aspiration is to make
sense of the First Law of Ecology, that everything is connected to everything else.
Environmental law, like all law, ultimately must function in the real world, a world
made up of multiple interlocking systems. We humans individually and collectively
are indeed significant components of many of these multiple systems. But we are not
hermetically set apart from the systemic elements and networks that do not operate
on our own terms, just as we are not disconnected from the consequences of our own
actions.
59
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
nor tear down the cultural treasures of the past for insubstantial
short-term reasons.
Carbon control rods, and the processes that erode them. If nuclear
fission is a workable metaphor for the powerful interconnections,
reactions, and drive of the marketplace economy, as suggested in
Chart Two, then perhaps government statutes and regulatory pro-
grams should be conceived of as a system of carbon control rods,
civic constraint mechanisms consciously inserted from the perime-
ter into the midst of the marketplace sphere in which the poten-
tially cataclysmic phenomena reside, in order to moderate and
control the powerful systems' destructive tendency to run wild. In
environmental law and elsewhere, agencies and statutory pro-
grams typically are legislatively created and imposed upon the
marketplace in moments of vividly perceived market failures, to
correct them for the future. Disasters to humans and to nature
like Love Canal, the Kepone incident, the Exxon-Valdez oil spill,
and whooping cranes on the verge of extinction create momentary
transparency for marketplace situations otherwise obscured from
public recognition, and from them we get statutes like the Com-
prehensive Environmental Resource Conservation and Liability
Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, a strengthened
Clean Water Act, Oil Protection Act of 1990, and the Endangered
Species Act.
But the metaphor goes further. From the moment they are
inserted, control rods are embattled by the very forces that re-
quired their imposition, and, unless they are maintained, strength-
ened, and renewed, over time they tend to deteriorate. When the
moments of vivid public concern that created them dim into retro-
spect, civic enactments coming from outside the marketplace econ-
omy lose some of their sustaining force. When the generative civic
moment passes, the daily realities of the iron triangles and mar-
ketplace forces that created the problems necessitating civic con-
trols in the first place begin to erode the control mechanisms.
Consider the sad, real-world record of governmental regulation of
mining, logging, overgrazing, overfishing, chemicals in our food
chains, and at how the ESA's protections for the last natural popu-
lation of our endangered fish were erased by the Tellico Dam.
The politics of resistance against civic regulation. Observing the
political reaction that rallied against the snail darter injunction,
we came to see it within the context of a much larger process of
resistance to governmental regulation. Understandably, major
[Vol. 19482
60http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol19/iss2/1
2002] ENVTL LAW IN THE POLITICAL ECOSYSTEM 483
players within the marketplace economy coordinate and interlink
themselves into networks of lobbies, trade organizations, and
other coalitions designed to promote and protect the self-interest
of their industries. A broad resistance to the imposition of exter-
nal regulatory controls is a natural inclination, and from it a wide-
spread national anti-regulatory movement has resurged in the
past twenty-five years. The breadth of reaction revealed in the
ESA hearings included lobbying and testimony from the National
Association of Manufacturers, the Business Roundtable, the Pa-
cific Legal Foundation, the homebuilding industry, Edison Elec-
tric Institute, Chemical Manufacturers Association, ranching,
mining, corporate agriculture, pulp and paper industries, and
many more.
The tone of the political debate often cast the snail darter as a
representative of much more than the endangered species issue.
It was an opportunity to trivialize and undercut regulatory gov-
ernment in general. Direct attacks on air or water pollution stat-
utes can be politically dangerous. The images that then come to
the public's mind are of vulnerable humans choking for breath or
drinking water sources choked with sludge and dead fish. But the
images summoned by endangered species protection, on the other
hand, do not evoke the same depth of human concern. The ESA is
broadly supported by the public, Senator Baker's aide admitted to
us, but, he smiled, "although it may be a mile wide it's only an
inch deep." If he and his allies could depict endangered species as
conflicting with human welfare, the public would come to realize
that this and other environmental regulations were too severe.
Viewing the politics of environmental law through the per-
spective of the snail darter and the three economies suggests a
spectrum of different processes by which the marketplace operates
in all the branches of government and national life to resist the
imposition of various civic-societal regulations. Iron triangles,
agency capture, media and public opinion campaigns, agenda-
driven judicial appointments, the creation of industry-oriented
"public interest law firms" and academic foundations, 78 a well-
78. Lewis Powell prepared a memorandum for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
shortly before he went onto the Supreme Court. In it, he decried the creeping social-
ism dominating America, as exemplified by civil rights, consumerism, and environ-
mentalism, and he called for business to begin funding academic and representational
programs and foundations to counteract the 1960s ideologies in American society.
The Powell Memorandum led directly to the founding of the Heritage Foundation and
other similar initiatives. See Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, Attack On American Free Enterprise System (August 23,
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funded "Wise Use" movement, regulatory erosions argued as nec-
essary for global trade. Anti-regulatory initiatives can be tracked
in such disparate settings as national environmental education
association conventions 79 and industry-funded Montana junkets
providing more than forty percent of the nation's federal judges
with week-long free vacation resort seminars on how the ESA and
other environmental statutes are economically unwise and
unconstitutional.8 0
In the judicial context, the marketplace anti-regulatory
agenda can be tracked in the evolving jurisprudence of the federal
judiciary as it has been reshaped over the past twenty years be-
ginning with the Meese-Sununu years of judicial appointments.8 1
In the legal process context, generally there are five sectors of po-
litical initiative that have been deployed with varying success over
time to undercut regulatory effectiveness. Cutting back on citizen
enforcement is one important strategy, as the Supreme Court's
current majority has sought increasing limits on citizen standing,
and agencies and Congress craft procedures where discretion
reigns and clear-cut violations are harder to establish.8 2 Doc-
1971) (Copy on file with Pace Environmental Law Review.). See also Oliver Houck,
With Charity for All, 93 Yale L.J. 1415 (1984) (analyzing how industry has created
and financed "public interest law firms" as "charitable organizations" to promote busi-
ness interests against governmental regulation in the public interest). Law-and-eco-
nomics professors have reportedly received funding amounting to tens of millions of
dollars to develop the impressive current corpus of pro-business academic justifica-
tions for the dominance of marketplace dynamics.
79. See Thomas Harvey Holt, Growing Up Green: Are Schools Turning Our Kids
Into Eco-Activists? REASON MAGAZINE, October 1991, at 37-40.
80. See Joe Stephens, Judges' Free Trips Go Unreported, WASHINGTON POST, Fri-
day, June 30, 2000, Al; Ruth Marcus, Issues Groups Fund Seminars For Judges,
WASHINGTON POST, Thursday, April 9, 1998, Al; COMMUNITY RIGHTS COUNSEL, NOTH-
ING FOR FREE, How PRIVATE JUDICIAL SEMINARS ARE UNDERMINING ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTIONS AND BREAKING THE PUBLIC'S TRUST (July 2000) at http://
www.tripsforjudges.org/crc.pdf (last visited June 23, 2002) accessed through
www.communityrights.org.
81. See generally William E. Kovacic, The Reagan Judiciary and Environmental
Policy: The Impact of Appointments to the Federal Courts of Appeals, 18 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 669 (1991).
82. The Laidlaw decision in the Supreme Court is one of very few recent cases
upholding citizen standing. The trend is overwhelmingly in the opposite direction.
See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC) Inc., 528 U.S. 167
(2000). See generally PLATER ET AL., NATURE, LAw & SOCIETY, supra note 29, at
398-418.
The five main sectors of current anti-regulatory legal initiatives are:
1-Restricting Citizen Enforcement: The post-'60s pluralism that built envi-
ronmental law on the foundation of the civil rights, anti-war, and consumerist move-
ments, likewise focused on citizen action and citizen law enforcement. If citizen
enforcement is blocked, then many regulatory laws will be ineffective, and "Iron Tri-
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angles"-made up of regulated industries, supportive legislators, and suborned agen-
cies-can continue to dominate in the traditional insider-politics fashion. Severe
constraints have increasingly been placed on citizen enforcement by legislative riders
and judicial holdings, particularly in the area of standing to sue. The Supreme
Court's 2000 Laidlaw decision somewhat abated the siege against citizen standing,
though the 2001 Sandoval decision illustrates the continuing effort to constrain citi-
zen suits. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Enviornmental Services (TOC), Inc.,
528 U.S. 167 (2000); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
2-Devolution: Efforts in courts and legislatures to recapture regulatory powers
from the federal government and recommit them back to the states. This effort has
utilized a selective "federalist" argument picking up and going beyond earlier states'
rights arguments targeting federal civil rights enforcement. It builds on the "divide-
and-conquer," "race-to-the-bottom" political logic that if regulation of the marketplace
is devolved to 50 different legal systems, the efficiency and impact of regulation over-
all will decline. Recent manifestations include Bush administration suggestions that
determinations on required degrees of pollution control should be shifted back to the
states that best know their own situations, and recent Supreme Court decisions like
Lopez, Morrison, and SWANCC that cut back the scope of federal regulatory jurisdic-
tion. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S., 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000); Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
On the other hand, when states are more protective of health and environment
than the federal government, putative states' rights advocates may shift to pre-emp-
tion arguments. See Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992) (state
hazardous waste occupational safety and health training standards impliedly pre-
empted by OSHA); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001)
(plaintiffs tort claims impliedly preempted by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act);
Cippilone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 544 (1992) (Scalia dissent urging that all
state tort claims for cigarette-induced injuries are impliedly pre-empted by federal
statutes); Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U. S. 481 (1987) (holding that the Clean
Water Act pre-empts Vermont's tort suit against a New York polluter's fouling of Ver-
mont waters); U.S. v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (holding state restrictions on hazards
of oil tanker spills pre-empted); Rush Prudential v. Moran, 122 S.Ct. 2151, 2171
(2002) (Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy dissenting against majority holding
that federal statute does not pre-empt state health care patients' rights); see also E.J.
Dionne, "Conservatives Use States' Rights as a Pretext," NEWSDAY, June 26, 2002 at
page A29.
3-Delegation challenges: The "non-delegation" doctrine (arguing that a statu-
tory delegation of power to an agency for a particular action is void because it was not
done properly) is recurringly used, selectively, in judicial review attempts to curtail
regulatory actions. The non-delegation doctrine has been used extensively in state
judicial review of administrative actions, and had been repeatedly urged on the Su-
preme Court by Justice Rehnquist in certain environmental cases, starting with the
Benzene regulation case in 1980. Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum
Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (the "Benzene" case). The Court's 2001 American Trucking
decision, however, backed away from asserting a heightened delegation standard for
federal judicial reviews of administrative actions. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). In some settings, however, the same forces that make
statutory delegation challenges against strong federal agencies will advocate defer-
ence to the decision of agencies that see the regulatees' side of things.
4-"Re-inventing Government"-Applying Cost-Benefit-Risk analysis as
a prescriptive standard for regulatory decisionmaking, (overriding the "P"
Principles: The Precautionary and Polluter-Pays Principles): This initiative is re-
flected in attempts to establish "market-based regulation," market-oriented cost-ben-
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trines of deference and devolution to the states undercut the fed-
eral matrix that built environmental law, although in selected
cases where states regulate more stringently than the federal
agencies, the strategy shifts 1800 toward federal pre-emption of
state regulations.8 3 Reinvigorating the doctrines restricting the
delegation of power to agencies is another strategy enforced selec-
tively, alternating with the doctrine of deference to agency deci-
sions in cases where agencies are more accommodating to
marketplace requisites. Efforts to imply market-based cost-bene-
fit-risk analyses as a prescriptive standard for regulatory decision
making are a fourth strategy, incorporating an inherent bias in
favor of costs that can be accounted in the marketplace economy
and discounting values in the natural and civic spheres. Property
rights and regulatory takings challenges constitute the fifth sector
of anti-regulatory initiative, with the doctrine of inverse condem-
nation pushed to unprecedented extremes in attempts to chill and
reverse environmental regulations that impose costs on the
marketplace.
The anti-regulatory initiatives can be discerned throughout
the different branches of government and public policy debate,
and tends to color how we conceive of the proper role of govern-
ment as a whole. At times, as during the Gingrich revolution of
efit formulas, and risk analysis as determinative procedures in setting and enforcing
regulatory standards domestically and abroad. Although it has had powerful effect in
many lower court decisions as well as national legislative policy, the Supreme Court's
American Trucking decision backed away here too from asserting a fundamental legal
role for cost-benefit-risk analysis.
5-Regulatory Takings Challenges: The constitutional claim that government
regulation that "goes too far" in its impact upon private business enterprises will be
void, or held to be compensable. The definition of the extent of private rights, of pub-
lic rights, and of when a regulation goes "too far" is an intensely political process, in
which private rights initiatives currently are strongly in the ascendancy. Uncertainty
about how private property rights will be weighed serves to chill new regulation as
well as encouraging state and local courts to broaden the scope of required compensa-
tion for existing regulations. The Court's Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierra cases are the
latest window into the judicial politics of regulatory takings. See Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (2002).
83. Our credible modern environmental protection law grew through the leverage
of "cooperative federalism" schemes providing uniform federal minimum regulatory
standards, blocking the interstate race to the bottom. See PLATER ET AL., NATURE,
LAW & SOCIETY, supra note 29, at 309-313. That the race to the bottom divide-and-
conquer strategy is real, despite a good deal of recent wistful revisionist denial, one
need only consider the core attempts in the 104th Contract with America Congress to
neuter environmental law by shifting it back to the states. See generally DEAN MC-
SWEENEY & JOHN E. OWENS, THE REPUBLICAN TAKEOVER OF CONGRESS (St. Martin's
Press, New York) (1998).
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the 104th Congress or in many opinions expressed by Justice
Scalia or Rush Limbaugh, government is depicted as a barely le-
gitimate necessary evil, a junior partner to the marketplace.8 4
I suggest that we need a re-conception of government as more
than a supportive partnership with the marketplace, though part-
nership is fine as far as it goes. If government is neutralized as an
effective long-term mechanism for asserting and implementing
public values, however, then the power of the marketplace be-
comes unconstrained. It becomes a system where the impulses
that have produced the crashes of some of the world's largest com-
panies characterize the daily governance of the society. The mar-
ketplace economy resists the fences and carbon rods of govern-
ment, but it necessitates them, or we will find ourselves less a na-
tion state than a network of economic warlords. Current bulletins
from Afghanistan show that is no prescription for a sustainable
society. A system driven by essentially individual motivations
without a concurrent societal ethic internalizing civic community
principles is a recipe for disaster, environmentally and beyond.
Aristotle himself seems to have recognized this. In the Poli-
tika, I have been told, the classic phrase which is usually trans-
lated as "Man is a political animal" can also be read in Greek to
say that "[A hu]man is an animal who lives within a polis." The
polis was the Greek city-state, the aggregation of individual citi-
zens in a communal relationship with shared civic rights and re-
sponsibilities that carried Athens to its democratic heights. If our
modern society is to shepherd the extraordinary accomplishments
84. This perspective also casts doubt on some of the more extreme assertions
about an era of government-industry partnership as a "third generation" of environ-
mental law. By the 1980s it may be that the framework of federal pollution laws had
generally become accepted by the marketplace, shaping internal industry planning
and giving rise to the small but vital secondary sector of pollution control business.
But how does one then explain the 104th Congress? The dramatic events of the Con-
tract with America Congress in 1994 vividly demonstrated that the inherent instinct
of the marketplace to unshackle itself and externalize social costs had not disap-
peared. Because industry was able to capture the House of Representatives, its
Project Relief proceeded to push bills overturning a broad swath of protective environ-
mental and social welfare laws. Species protection listings under the Endangered
Species Act were subjected to a year-long statutory moratorium. Entrepreneurial
human nature had not been reversed by years of industrial accommodation to envi-
ronmental regulation. Had it not been for the bravery in particular of Republican
Senator John Chaffee of Rhode Island, Chair of the Senate Environment and Public
Works Committee, many more corrosive statutes would have been passed in the
104th Congress, and we would not today recognize the landscape of environmental
law. May he rest in peace. And if it recurred today, who would stand before the storm
that might again be unleashed?
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it has achieved to date, and enjoy a sustainable basis for main-
taining and nurturing humans and their planetary environment
over generations to come, then it must continue to be character-
ized by an Aristotelian recognition of the essential and legitimate
role of civic government as well as the dynamism of individualized
enterprise in the marketplace.
Coda. As I have demonstrated, it is easy to become grandiose and
didactic in the attempt to define where environmental law fits into
the societal cosmology. In more prosaic terms, however, we are
left with the question of how to integrate political realities, struc-
tures, and contexts into the way we approach and teach environ-
mental law. The enterprise is undoubtedly easier at the level of
increasing our students' awareness of everyday practical politics.
We should not hesitate to expose our students to practical simula-
tions of complex regulatory cases and judiciously chosen war sto-
ries, scoping out the broad range of players and the different
structures and networks in which they play. Such revealing
glances and anecdotes can induce practical political savvy and so-
phistication in law students who too often still assume that the
eighth grade civics book is a sufficient descriptor of the way envi-
ronmental law and their own careers will function through the
years.
On the grander scale, we all consciously or unconsciously for-
mulate an internal construct by which we understand the compo-
nents, functions, and structures of society and its governance. For
better or worse this essay offers the suggested construct of a legal
process and a system of governance functioning in the context of
three interconnected economies uniquely well illuminated by the
ongoing evolution of environmental law. Humans, corporations,
markets, and the disparate segments and systems of the natural
environment-these are not dissociated individual islands float-
ing in a vacuum. They all exist in a web of direct and indirect
interconnections, and environmental law in its focus on sus-
tainability is the progressive conservative jurisprudence that
takes on all of that as its territory.
Viewed from this perspective-a perspective shaped by our
battles for the snail darter, the river, and the Endangered Species
Act-the coming years of environmental law undoubtedly will con-
tinue to track the ongoing evolution of modern democracy.
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